The realization of Mehmed IV's Ghazi title at the campaing of Kamaniçe by Yoldaşlar, Özgün Deniz & Yoldaslar, Ozgun Deniz
  
THE REALIZATION OF MEHMED IV'S GHAZİ TITLE AT THE CAMPAIGN OF 
KAMANİÇE 
 
 
 
 
By 
ÖZGÜN DENİZ YOLDAŞLAR 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of 
 the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
July 2013
 
THE REALIZATION OF MEHMED IV'S GHAZİ TITLE AT THE CAMPAIGN OF 
KAMANİÇE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY: 
 
Tülay Artan                …………………………. 
(Thesis Supervisor) 
 
İ. Metin Kunt             …………………………. 
 
 
İzak Atiyas                 …………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:  …………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Özgün Deniz Yoldaşlar 2013 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
THE REALIZATION OF MEHMED IV'S GHAZİ TITLE AT THE CAMPAIGN OF 
KAMANİÇE 
 
Özgün Deniz Yoldaşlar 
History, M. A. Thesis, Spring 2013 
Thesis Supervisor: Tülay Artan  
Keywords: Mehmed IV, Ghazi Sultans, Abaza Hasan Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 
Kamaniçe. 
 
  
In 1658 Sultan Mehmed IV was officially given the title of Ghazi with a fatwa of 
the Şeyhülislam; but it was not until in 1672 that this title materialized in concrete 
manner. This was unique, as for the first time in Ottoman history a sultan was officially 
- not rhetorically- receiving the Ghazi title prior to actually taking part in a campaign. In 
examining this unique case, the present study poses the following questions: under what 
circumstances was the Ghazi title first given to Mehmed IV in 1658 and why did he join 
the Kamaniçe campaign in 1672? To answer these questions, it advances two 
arguments.              
First, it argues that Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title was launched by the ruling elites as a 
legitimization tool against Abaza Hasan Paşa, the provincial governor who had revolted 
against the rigid rule of the Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1658. Second, it 
argues that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into three parts (Grand Vizier, 
İstanbul Kaymakamı, and Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı) in the 1660s, which created 
complications during the siege of Candia, should have convinced some state officials 
that the Sultan should personally lead the campaigns in the 1670s. As a corollary, the 
study proposes to view the personal appearance of Mehmed IV in the campaign of 
Kamaniçe as an attempt to unify the state bureaucracy within a more limited ground, to 
smooth the way for centralizing the decision making process.  
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ÖZET 
 
4. MEHMED’İN GAZİ ÜNVANININ KAMANİÇE SEFERİ’NDE GERÇEKLİK 
KAZANMASI 
 
Özgün Deniz Yoldaşlar 
Tarih, Master Tezi, Bahar 2013 
Tez Danışmanı: Tülay Artan 
 
Keywords: 4. Mehmed, Gazi Sultanlar, Abaza Hasan Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 
Kamaniçe. 
 
1658 yılında, 4. Mehmed’e Şeyhülislam fetvasıyla resmi olarak Gazi ünvanı 
verildi, fakat bu ünvan Sultan’ın 1672 yılında Kamaniçe seferine katılmasına kadar 
somut bir biçimde gerçeklik kazanmadı. Osmanlı tarihinde ilk defa bir padişah retorik 
bir şekilde değil, resmi olarak, Gazi ünvanını savaşa fiilen katılmadan önce almış 
oluyordu. Bu istisnai durumu incelerken mevcut çalışma şu soruları soruyor: 4. 
Mehmed’e 1658’de Gazi ünvanı hangi koşullar altında verildi ve kendisi neden 1672 
yılında Kamaniçe seferine katıldı? Bu sorulara cevap vermek için elimizdeki çalışma 
iki sav ileri sürüyor. 
Bu tez, ilk olarak 4. Mehmed’in Gazi ünvanının 1658 yılında, Sadrazam Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa’nın katı yönetimine karşı ayaklanan Anadolu valilerinden Abaza Hasan 
Paşa’ya karşı yönetici elit tarafından bir meşruiyet aracı olarak hayata geçirildiğini 
tartışıyor. İkinci olarak, Kandiye kuşatması sırasında karışıklık yaratan, 1660’larda 
devlet bürokrasisinin üçe bölünme durumu (Sadrazam, İstanbul Kaymakamı ve Rikab-ı 
Hümayun Kaymakamı), bazı devlet görevlilerini sultanın da 1670’li yıllarda seferlere 
bizzat katılmasına ikna etmiş olmalı. Bunun sonucu olarak, bu çalışma 4. Mehmed’in 
Kamaniçe seferine bizzat katılmasını, karar verme sürecinin merkezileşmesini 
kolaylaştırmak adına, devlet bürokrasisini daha dar bir zeminde birleştirmeye yönelik 
bir girişim olduğunu öneriyor.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
In the present study, I attempt to examine the realization of Mehmed IV’s Ghazi 
title at the campaign of Kamaniçe in 1672. By “realization”, I refer to the fact that 
although the title of Ghazi was given to him with a Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658, it was 
not until 1672 that this title materialized in concrete manner. In 1672, he directly 
attended the Kamaniçe campaign and appeared in the battlefield with the army. This 
peculiar characteristic of Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title distinguished him from his 
predecessors throughout the post-Süleymanic age in the sense that for the first time in 
Ottoman history a sultan, not rhetorically, but officially took the Ghazi title prior to 
actually taking part in a campaign. In other words, despite the fact that the Ghazi title 
was rhetorically used in the Ottoman zafernames (conquest book) occasionally for the 
purpose of praising the military success of the sultans who did not even lead the army 
personally, an official usage of it was unprecedented in the Ottoman historical writing. 
This is due to the fact that Ottoman historians generally preferred to use the canonical 
titles which highlighted the legitimacy of a sultan’s power, considering political 
exigencies of the time period they lived in. However, the most striking point in the case 
of Mehmed IV is that he was formally designated as ‘Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han’ with a 
fatwa that relied upon a consensus of the ruling elites, including janissaries 
commanders, Ulema and high ranking state officials.   
 
My main objective here is to explore why Mehmed IV decided to attend the 
Kamaniçe campaign although he had already gotten the Ghazi title nearly fourteen 
years before the military expedition. At first glance, we can see his decision as an 
attempt to bring state affairs under his own control after a long period of stay away, but 
if we further consider the developments occurred in the Ottoman court structure during 
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the second half of the seventeenth century, a different picture appears. Formerly, while 
Grand Vizier had been commanding the army in the battlefield, his deputy, Kaymakam, 
would have stayed in Istanbul and conducted the state affairs on his behalf. However, 
during the reign of Mehmed IV, when the sultan was in sayd ü şikar and geşt ü güzar, a 
third office known as Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamlığı (Deputy of the royal stirrup) 
increased in importance, which led to a tripartite court and bureaucracy. This resulting 
disunity in the Ottoman government in the second half of the seventeenth might have 
contributed to the participation of Mehmed IV to the campaigns after the 1670s, in 
order to smooth the way for the centralizing the decision making process. Especially, 
his indecisive behaviors towards the Venetian ambassador during the siege of the 
Candia between the years of 1667-1669, as his correspondences with Köprülü Fazıl 
Ahmed Pasha make evident, should have forced some state officials to lead the 
campaigns along with the sultan himself.  
 
In the first chapter, I will try to touch upon some problematized issues in the 
recent Ottoman historiography concerning the early modern Ottoman court structure by 
tracing the usage of “Ghazi” in the post-Süleymanic age. The objective of this chapter 
revolves around two interrelated issues. On the one hand, I will trace the current 
historiographical discussion revolving around the usage of Ghazi title for the Ottoman 
sultans who ascended the throne after the death of Süleyman I, for a better 
understanding of its canonical dimension. On the other hand, through an elaboration of 
the Şehname literature, which dominated Ottoman historical writing throughout the 
second half of the sixteenth century and the first two decades of the following century, I 
will discuss the changing role of the sultans in the Ottoman political history reflecting 
on the fundamental changes in the Ottoman court structure. 
 
In the second chapter, I will examine the reasons as to why the Ghazi title was 
given to Mehmed IV in 1658 with a Şeyhülislam fatwa. The chapter will demonstrate 
that the reason behind the sanctioning of Mehmed IV as “Ghazi” with a fatwa issued by 
the Şeyhülislam lies in the mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa who revolted against the rigid 
rule of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. I will also argue that the title was used as a 
legitimization tool by the ruling elites against Abaza Hasan Paşa who interrupted “the 
holy war” of Mehmed IV waged against the infidels in the European front. In other 
words, in the face of Abaza Hasan Paşa’s attempt to legitimate his own political claims, 
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the ruling elite at the time called upon the so-called ‘frozen legitimacy’1 of the earlier 
Ottoman sultans, by emphasizing the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV. In this context, by 
focusing on the political atmosphere of the 1650s, I will try to explain the reason 
behind the ruling elite’s reworking of the title to enhance the legitimacy of the dynastic 
claim.  
 
The third chapter constitutes the mainstay of the present thesis. By focusing on 
the last stage of the Cretean campaign, I inquire why Mehmed IV joined the Kamaniçe 
campaign in 1672. At first glance, although his personal “willingness” to participate in 
the campaigns and the guidance of Vani Mehmed Efendi seem to have shaped the 
sultan’s ultimate decision, the main argument of this chapter, which seeks an alternative 
answer to the above-mentioned question, will concentrate on the disunity in the 
Ottoman bureaucracy during the second half of the seventeenth century. I will argue 
that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into three parts (grand vizier, 
İstanbul kaymakamı and Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı) in the 1660s, which created 
complications during the siege of Candia, might have forced some Ottoman state 
officials to take action against this disunity by setting the sultan out to the campaign. As 
a corollary, we can view the appearance of Mehmed IV in the campaign of Kamaniçe 
in person as an attempt to unify the state bureaucracy within a more limited ground. 
The campaign, on the other hand, was perceived by the ruling elites as an opportunity 
to convey broader messages to the public regarding the dynastic legitimacy of the 
House of Osman by restoring the sultan to his previous position as the military leader. 
 
Sources and Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century 
 
Primary Sources 
 
The scope of the current thesis allows using only a couple of narrative sources. 
Here, I prefer to provide an overview of all the relevant primary sources concerning the 
reign of Mehmed IV. The primary sources at our disposal for a study about the reign of 
                                                          
1
 Colin Imber, “Frozen legitimacy”, in Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State 
Power, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: 
Brill, 2005), 99-107.  
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Mehmed IV largely fall into three categories: (1) general histories on the reign of 
Mehmed IV (both contemporary ones and various accounts composed afterwards). (2) 
gazavatnames on the conquest of Candia and the campaign of Kamaniçe. (3) And travel 
accounts written in both English and French.  
 
Among the above mentioned sources, the historical accounts written during 
Mehmed IV’s reign constitute the majority. Mehmed Halife’s Tarih-i Gilmani2 is one 
of the contemporary narrative works consulted in this study. Halife’s account covers the 
years from 1623 to 1664, from the time when Murad IV ascended the throne till the 
treaty of Vasvar was signed. Since he remained in stay in the Inner Palace while he 
composing his history, it includes details which cannot be found in any other 
contemporary accounts. For example; that Mehmed IV was sanctioned as Ghazi is only 
mentioned in Tarih-i Gilmani. Another other account written by Vecihi Hasan Çelebi, 
who was the secretary of the imperial council between the years 1644-1660, comprises 
the events occurred between 1637 and 1660.
3
 Mehmed Halife and Vecihi are the only 
contemporary historians who narrate the period between 1657 and 1663. Other 
seventeenth-century historians, Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi,
4
 Katip Çelebi
5
 and 
Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi Efendi
6
 had already completed their histories in 1657. 
The history of Mustafa Naima, known as Ravzat ül-Hüseyin fî Hulâsat Ahbâr el-
hâfikeyn,
7
 can be accepted as a retrospective account due to its composition date 
(1704), but it is worth mentioning here because it comes up to the year 1660. Although 
Mustafa Naima, known as the first Ottoman official chronicler, was not an eye-witness 
of the events of the 1650s, his intellectual capacity for weaving various preceding 
                                                          
2
 Mehmed Halife, “Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani,” ed. Ertuğrul Oral, PhD diss., (Marmara 
Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2001), XI-XV. 
3
 Vecihi Hasan Çelebi, “Vecihî, Devri ve Eseri,” ed. Ziya Akkaya, PhD. Diss., (Ankara 
Üniversitesi DTCF,1957), 1-83.  
4
 Kara Çelebi-zade Abdül’aziz, Ravzatü'l Ebrar Zeyl-i (Tahlil ve Metin), ed. Nevzat Kaya (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2003). 
5
 Katip Çelebi, “Kâtip Çelebi, Fezleke: Tahlil ve Metin, I-III,” ed, Zeynep Aycibin, PhD diss., 
(Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007). 
6
 Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, Solakzade Tarihi, (Istanbul, 1297).  
7
 Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima (Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî hulâsati ahbâri'l-hâfikayn), ed, Mehmet 
İpşirli, 4 Vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), vol. 1, XIII-XXXI. 
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narrative accounts together renders the Ravzat ül-Hüseyin most comprehensive history 
of the 1650s.  
 
In addition, I will be mostly benefitting from the Vekayiname of Abdi Paşa who 
was born in Anadolu Hisarı and educated in the Enderun School, a place in the third 
courtyard of the Topkapı Palace in which recruited Christian children were educated for 
the purpose of serving in various positions in the Empire. Shortly after Mehmed IV 
ascended to the throne, he was moved to Büyük Oda in Topkapı Palace where he had an 
opportunity to be close to the Sultan. Throughout his career, he was appointed to 
various ranks in the administrative system including imperial chancellorship (nişancı), 
the deputy of grand vizier in Istanbul (kaymakam) and the governorship of Basra. 
Although he is not recognized as the first official chronicler in Ottoman historiography, 
Abdi Pasha can be accepted as the court historian who was appointed by Mehmed IV 
himself to write the history of his reign. The creative process by which he composed 
the Vekayiname can be divided into two periods: Before he was appointed as the court 
historian in 1664, Abdi Paşa mostly constructed his account by relying on the previous 
historians’ works. On the other hand, he was an eyewitness to the years from 1664 to 
1678, so his account will be invaluable for the main themes of the current study.
8
 
Another primary source about this period is ‘Ȋsâ-zâde Tarihi by ‘Ȋsâ Efendi. He held 
various offices during his incumbency, including the judgeship of Istanbul. The last 
parts his history was posthumous work composed after his death by his son, Mehmed 
Aziz, but its earlier parts give concise information about such issues as; military 
campaigns, change of positions in the political and religious realm, the comings and 
goings of foreign ambassadors.
9
 Tarih-i Nihadi, written by an unknown author, narrates 
the Ottoman history from its beginning to 1685. It is possible to infer from the content 
that he was an eyewitness to the reign of Mehmed IV.
10
 
 
                                                          
8
 Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa,  ekâyi -nâme   smanlı  arihi     -1682 : Tahlil ve Metin Tenkidi, ed. 
Fahri Çetin Derin. (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008), XIII-XIX, XXVI-XXVII. 
9
 İsazade, İsazade  arihi (Metin ve  ahlil), ed, Ziya Yılmazer, (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 
1996), XXIII-XXVI.  
10
 Nihadi, “Tarih-i Nihâdî (152b-233a),” ed. Hande Nalan Özkasap, MA Thesis, (Marmara 
Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2004), XII-XIV. 
6 
 
Other narrative accounts were completed after the reign of Mehmed IV. Under 
this category, there are four main works: Zübde-i Vekayiât, written by Defterdar Sarı 
Mehmed Pasha and completed between the years 1714-1716, briefly touches upon the 
siege of Candia and Kamaniçe campagin.
11
 Secondly, Raşid Mehmed Efendi, to whom 
the official duty of “vak’a-nüvislik” was given in 1714, wrote Tarih-i Raşid as the 
continuation of Tarih-i Naima consisting the years 1660-1722.
12
 In that work, he 
mostly benefited from two works of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, namely Zeyl-i Fezleke or 
Silahtar Tarihi and Nusretname
13
. Thirdly, the history of Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed 
Ağa, known as Silahdar Tarihi14 which was written as sequel to Katip Çelebi’s Fezleke, 
incorporates the years 1654-1695. The importance of this work lies in his author’s 
having held various offices in the palace, thus he got very invaluable information about 
the inner circle of the court. Lastly, Silsiletü’l-Âsafîyye Fî Devleti’l-Hakaniyyetü’l-
Osmâniyye (Târîh-i Sülâle-i Köprülü)
15
 written by Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi in 
the eighteenth century uses the previous written biographies of the seven members of 
the Köprülü family.  
 
The second group forming the basis of this study is the gazavatnames narrating 
the siege of Candia and the campaign of Kamaniçe. The Jewels of History (Cevâhirü’t-
Tevârîh)
16
 written by Hasan Agha, who was the seal keeper of Fazıl Ahmed Pasha 
                                                          
11
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekayiât. Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1116/1656-1704), ed, 
Abdülkadir Özcan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), XXVII-XXXII. 
12
 Raşid Mehmed Efendi, Çelebizâde İsmaîl Âsım Efendi, Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli ( 07 -1114 / 
1660-1703), ed. Abdülkadir Özcan, Yunus Uğur, Baki Çakır, A. Zeki İzgöer, 3 vols., (Istanbul: 
Klasik Yayınları: 2013), XV-XXXIV.  
13
 Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Nusretnâme (1106- 
1133/1695-1721)”, Tahlil ve Metin”, ed. Mehmet Topal PhD. Diss., (Marmara Üniversitesi, 
Türkiyat Araştırmaları, 2001). 
14
 Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Zeyl-i Fezleke (1065-22 Ca.1106 / 1654-7 Şubat 1695),” ed. 
Nazire Karaçay Türkal, PhD diss., (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2012), 
XIII-XXII.  
15
 Behceti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi, “Behceti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi ‘Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülü’ 
(Transkripsiyon ve Tahlil),” ed. Mehmet Fatih Gökçek, MA Thesis, (Marmara Üniversitesi 
Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2006), VII-XI. 
16
 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Mühürdar Hasan Ağa - Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih, ed. Abubekir Sıddık Yücel, 
(Sivas: Asitan Kitap, forthcoming), 13-33. I thank Prof. Yücel for sharing his book with me before 
its publication.  
7 
 
between the years of 1660-69, recounts of the eleven years (1658-1669) of the grand 
vizier’s tenure, from which firsthand knowledge about the two campaigns of the grand 
vizier as commander of the imperial army can be obtained including the siege of 
Candia between the years of 1667-1669. Most of the succeeding narrative accounts, 
such as Silahdar Tarihi, Raşid  arihi, Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi’s (Târîh-i Sülâle-
i Köprülü and Osman Dede’s Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa17 borrow the narrative of the 
siege of Candia largely from the account of Hasan Ağa. Thus, I mostly address this 
account in the third chapter. 
 
With regard to the campaign of Kamaniçe, there are two narrative works which 
can be classified under the category of gazavatname genre. The first one is the account 
known as The Conquest of Kamaniçe (Fethname-i Kamaniçe)
18
, written by Yusuf Nabi, 
who obtained office in the palace by entering under the auspices of Musahib Mustafa 
Pasha in the 1660s. Many times in the following years several rewards bestowed upon 
him by the sultan with respect to his praiseworthy literary works. This fethname is 
accepted as the first literary work of his career. A second The Conquest of Kamaniçe 
was composed by Hacı Ali when he was under the service of Mustafa Pasha as Tezkire 
writer. It takes note of, day by day, all the menzil passed through during the Kamaniçe 
campaign.
19
 
 
Most of the above mentioned primary sources are available in transcription so I 
will refer to these transcriptions in my study. Due to the scope of my research, I do not 
tap into traveller accounts. The diary of Antoine Galland, who was the assistant of the 
French Ambassador known as Marquis de Nointel, is worth mentioning as it includes 
one of the most detailed accounts concerning the campaign parade of Mehmed IV and 
other state officials for the military expedition against Poland in 1672. Unlike other 
contemporary travelers’ writing about the Ottoman history, only Galland’s account 
                                                          
17
 Erzurumlu Osman Dede, “Köprülüzâde Ahmet Paşa Devrinde (1069-1080) Vukuatı Tarihi 
Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme,” ed. Arslan Poyraz, (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat 
Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2003), VI-XIV.  
18
 Yusuf Nabi, “Gazavât-nâmeler ve Nâbî`nin Fetih-nâme-i Kamaniçe Adlı Eserinin Metni,” ed. 
Hüseyin Yüksel, MA Thesis, (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997), 1-5, 39-
52.  
19
 Hacı Ali Efendi, “Ali Efendi ve Tarih-i Kamaniçe Adlı Eseri (Tahlil-Metin),” ed. Musa Taçkın, 
MA Thesis. (Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), VI-XI, XXIV-XXXIV. 
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narrates the parade down to a gnat’s eyebrow.20 Apart from this important source, travel 
accounts of Claes Ralamb,
21
 Francois de Chassepol,
22
 Louis Laurent D’ Arvieux,23 
Petits De Ia Croix,
24
 Marquis de Nointel,
25
 John Covel,
26
 Paul Rycaut
27
 are crucial in 
studying Ottomans’ seventeenth century.  
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Maybe the most comprehensive study devoted to the mid-seventeenth century of 
the Ottoman Empire is still Metin Kunt’s unpublished doctoral dissertation.28 Although 
its title refers to the incumbency of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa between the years 1656 and 
1661, the first part partially covers the first eight years of Mehmed IV’s reign, 
concentrating on the political and economic aspects of the period in question. I 
considerably benefit from Kunt’s study as regards with the international confrontations 
between the Ottoman state and European powers in the mid-seventeenth century. 
 
Another study that I partly use in my research is Leslie Peirce’s monograph on the 
Ottoman harem. Peirce studies the participation of the royal women in the exercise of 
                                                          
20
 Antoine Galland, İstanbul a ait günlük hâtıralar (  72-1673), tr. Nahid Sırrı Özik (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih kurumu, 1998). 
21
 Claes Ralamb, İstanbul’a bir Yolculuk,   57-58, tr. Ayda Arel, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi; 
2008). 
22
 Francois de Chassepol, The History of the Grand Visiers, Mahomet and Achmet Coprogli, of the 
Three last grand signiors their sultanas, their sultanas and chief favorites with the most secret 
intrigues of the seraglio... (London, 1677). 
23
 Louis Laurent D’ Arvieux, Mémoires du chevalier d’ Arvieux. 6 vols. (Paris, 1735). 
24
 Petits De Ia Croix,  Mémories du Sieur de la Croix. 2 vols. (Paris, 1684). 
25
 Albert. Mentz G. Vandal, L'odyssée d'un ambassadeur. Les voyages du Marquis de Nointel 
(1670-1680). (Paris, 1900). 
26
 J. Theodore Bent, Early voyages and travels in the levant: I. The diary of master Thomas 
Dallam, 1599-1600 ; II. Extracts from the diaries of dr. John Covel, 1670-1679 ; with some 
account of the levant company of Turkey merchants. (New York: Hakluyt Society, 1893). 
27
 Sir Paul Rycaut, The history of the Turkish Empire from the year 1623 to the year 1677 : 
containing the reigns of the three last emperours, viz. Sultan Morat or Amurat IV, Sultan Ibrahim, 
and Sultan Mahomet IV his son, the XIII. emperour now reigning, (London : R. Clavell, 1687); 
Rycaut, Sir Paul. The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, (Westmead: Greek International 
Publishers, 1972). 
28
 Metin Kunt, “The Köprülü Years (1656-1661),” PhD diss. (Princeton University, 1971). 
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Ottoman sovereignty concepts throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.
29
 
Unfortunately, her analysis ends with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as 
grand vizier in 1656, since she interprets his appointment as “The End of the ‘Sultanate 
of the Women’”.30 Despite the fact that the rest of Mehmed IV’s reign after the 
appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa is left out of the scope of this study to a large 
extent, her study concerning the struggle between the two valide sultans of the time, 
namely Kösem and Turhan sultans, is still fruitful in analyzing the factional politics 
within the royal family around the mid-seventeenth century. On the other hand, it can be 
said that Lucienne Thys-Şenocak begins her study where Peirce’s stop. By mainly 
focusing on Hatice Turhan Sultan’s two building projects, namely the Seddülbahir and 
Kumkale fortresses in the Dardanelles and the Yeni Valide Mosque complex in 
Istanbul, Şenocak tries to draw a relationship between visibility and legitimacy of the 
architectural works that Hatice Turhan commissioned through examining these projects 
as an expression of her religious piety and political authority. 
 
Two doctoral dissertations, whose main topics enable us to explore an alternative 
scheme about the political and religious understanding of the Ottoman society, are 
worth mentioning. Derin Terzioğlu by studying Mehmed el-Niyazi el-Mısri (1618-
1694)’s life and works in detail, inquires the boundaries between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy within the Ottoman religious and political discourse. The dissident views of 
Mısri to the prevailing Ottoman political discourse, especially his anti-Köprülü and anti-
Vani line, and his criticism of the House of ‘Osman, shed light upon how an individual, 
who was coming from the oppositional stance, perceived the Ottoman ruling and 
religious establishment in the seventeenth century.
31
 Cengiz Şişman’s dissertation 
focuses on the Sabbatian movement in the Ottoman Empire, which came to surface 
around the 1660s and then evolved into different forms in the succeeding centuries. In 
his own words, the main purpose of his thesis “is to interpret the messianic Sabbatian 
experience within the Ottoman material and cultural world and to write a monograph on 
                                                          
29
 Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire. (Oxford 
University Press: 1993).  
30
 Peirce, The Imperial Harem, 255.  
31
 Derin Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyazi-i Mısri (1618-1694),” PhD 
diss. (Harvard University, 1999). Especially, see chapter 4, 277-355. 
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this movement and its sects.”32 Şişman’s study is helpful in contextualizing this social 
and religious movement in its own historical circumstances with reference to the 
religious and political understanding in the seventeenth century.  
 
Despite the fact that each book touches upon the different subject matter, three 
outstanding studies of Dariusz Kolodziejczyk
33
 provide invaluable materials for the 
Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations in the seventeenth century. If we also take into 
consideration that Ottomans interest towards the Podolia region made itself more 
apparent after the mid-seventeenth century, the importance of the documents given in 
these books can easily be understood.  
 
Although it seems that the main purpose of Baki Tezcan’s The Second Ottoman 
Empire, is elaborate the political and social transformation of the Ottoman Empire in 
the early modern world, putting emphasis on the developments occurred at the end of 
the sixteenth and in the beginning of the seventeenth century, his study is important due 
to his overview of the rule of Köprülü family. Without putting much effort to scrutinize 
the socio-political forces and dynamics in the Ottoman realm at the time, namely 
Janissaries and the Ulema, he singles out this period to a considerable extent. For 
Köprülü period, Tezcan draws a picture of alliance between the Ottoman court and the 
Köprülü Grand Viziers. In this regard, Tezcan argues that “the political alliance 
between the court and the office of the grand vizier continued to the detriment of other 
political forces in the empire.”34 His argument in particular and the approach attributing 
Köprülüs great power and influence in general pose the danger of underestimating the 
agency of other political forces and actors. While the author marks the period until 
1703 with constant conflict between the ‘absolutists’ and the ‘constitutionalists’, he sets 
apart the Köprülü period as a relatively peaceful and stable period. In other words, such 
                                                          
32
 Cengiz Şişman, “A Jewish Messiah in the Ottoman Court: Sabbatai Sevi and the Emergence of a 
Judeo-Islamic Community, 1666–1720.” PhD diss., (Harvard University, 2004), 1.  
33
 Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th-18th century) : an annotated 
edition of ahdnames and other documents (Boston: Brill, 1999); Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The 
Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681) = Defter-i Mufassal-i Eyalet-i Kamaniçe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and 
Poland-Lithuania: international diplomacy on the European periphery: 15th-18th century: a study 
of peace treaties followed by annotated documents (Boston: Brill, 2011). 
34
 Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire Political and Social Transformation in the Early 
Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
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an understanding creates a dilemma: how did it become possible to suppress these 
sociopolitical forces with great influence on the Empire’s fate. Although the alliances 
that the Köprülü family forged present an explanation to the question to a certain 
extent, it falls short to explain the intricate structure of the sociopolitical webs and 
networks dominating the period.  
Marc David Baer in his Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and 
Conquest in Ottoman Europe
35
 suggests that his book departs from the previous studies 
on mainly three grounds. First of all, he tries to bring a new perspective about Mehmed 
IV’s persona by focusing on his achievements rather than his weak depiction seen both 
in the accounts of the subsequent writers who wrote after the reign of Mehmed IV and 
in the studies of the contemporary historians. Although his attempts to put Mehmed IV 
into the center of his narrative is noteworthy, the most fundamental problem regarding 
the way Baer depicts Mehmed IV is his ignorance of the broader political 
circumstances of the period, and of the key role of the Köprülü Family. Secondly, his 
uncritical reading of the contemporary narrative accounts leads him to overrate both the 
concepts of Ghaza and Jihad, which is his second contribution to the field. In this sense, 
the laudatory passages in the court histories misguide Baer to portray Mehmed IV as a 
“Ghazi sultan”. Without questioning the underlying purposes and the authenticity of his 
primary sources, he only pursues the rhetorical description of Mehmed IV as Ghazi 
sultan. On the other hand, his third contribution to the field is about the phenomenon of 
conversion during the second half of the seventeenth century in the Ottoman Empire. 
Baer attributes a peculiar characteristic to the conversion experienced during the reign 
of Mehmed IV, without studying the issue synchronically across centuries of the 
Ottoman rule. More importantly, despite nearly half a chapter in the book is devoted to 
Shabbatai Tzevi’s conversion,36 he does not benefit from Cengiz Şişman’s thesis on the 
Sabbatian movement. In the following sections of this thesis, some other problematic 
aspects of his approach will be mentioned.  
 
 
                                                          
35
 Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
36
 Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, 122-132. 
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Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century 
 
 
What are there any continuing aspects in the works of seventeenth-century 
histories and those written in preceding centuries? Rhoads Murphey singularly analyzes 
structural aspects of the Ottoman historiography.  The following excerpt from his 
article, Ottoman Historical writing in the Seventeenth-century”, touches upon the above 
mentioned question.  
 
 
“Broadly speaking, Ottoman historians of the seventeenth century 
may be classified according to their membership in one of three principal 
groups: the alim historians representing the perspective of the shariah, the 
katib historians representing the perspective of members of the state 
bureaucracy, and an increasingly dominant group of historians who were 
members of the sultan's inner circle of palace advisers and household 
attendants, the enderuni historians. 
One of the significant developments in seventeenth-century Ottoman 
historiography is the shift away from history written exclusively from the 
perspective of members of the outer state service, such as finance 
department and chancery secretaries, that is katibs of the financial (maliye) 
and chancellery (asafiye) branches of government service, to a new sort of 
history written by members of the sultan's personal household service, and 
intimates of the court. One subgroup within this broader category is made 
up by the musahib historians who as historians, personal companions, 
entertainers, and secret agents of the sultan, were answerable only to the 
sovereign himself.”37 
 
 
In this article, Murphey aims to show whether there were any common and 
consistent elements in the writings of Ottoman historians who wrote after the reign of 
Ahmed I (1603-1617), despite the fact that their careers and professional backgrounds 
varied from each other. He scrutinizes the way in which several historians narrate the 
dethronement of Ibrahim I (1640-1648). He states that despite the divergences in the 
general tone, all of the historians who depict the episode reflect the spirit of their times. 
According to Murphey, there is correlation between the historically constructed 
intellectual atmosphere and the ways in which the historian depicts a particular political 
episode. The typical seventeenth-century Ottoman historian was considered “as social 
                                                          
37
 Rhoads Murphey, “Ottoman Historical Writing in the Seventeenth-Century: A Survey of the 
General Development of the Genre After the Reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617),” Archivum 
Ottomanicum, 13 (1993-4): 281. 
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critic, satirist, and arbiter of and watch dog over standards of ethical behavior for 
holders of public office.”38 
 
In a similar way, this “history-writing was an exercise undertaken not only for the 
glorification of the dynasty, and the sustaining of its future reputation, but, chiefly, for 
the edification of contemporary rulers, administrators, and all those who are responsible 
for creating the conditions that would assure its continuance.”39 In that sense, 
Murphey’s interpretation partially ignores the discussion revolving around the 
Nasihatname literature
40
 in the Ottoman historiography, on the ground that Lütfi and 
Ali did not reflect the intellectual atmosphere of the era in which they lived in.
41
 
According to Murphey, the Ottoman mirror for prince genre came to the forefront in 
real terms not before the first half of the seventeenth century. To what extent he did 
ignore this historiography is open to debate. However, his emphasis the extent to which 
the professional backgrounds of these writers might have influenced their opinion while 
narrating Mehmed IV and his reign is of utmost importance. Nevertheless, without 
elaborating the equally important intellectual and political atmosphere of the period in 
question, the factional positions and the patronage relations of the writers, any 
argument would lack a solid ground.  
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Unfortunately, since the second half of the seventeenth century has been largely 
neglected by Ottomanists, analytical and comprehensive studies concentrated on the 
thematic content of Ottoman historians’ works still lack in the Ottoman historiography, 
as a consequence, it is very difficult to trace the structural analysis of this era properly. 
At this point, Marc David Baer’s studies42 partially fill the gap. However, although he 
analyzed nearly all the relevant narrative sources written in Ottoman Turkish, he 
brought some important methodological problems to the front in his works ignoring 
some basic historical frameworks and overlooking the primary sources of the period in 
question. Since Baer, as Kunt rightly puts, is “interested in representation rather than 
politics”43, he disregarded the political and intellectual atmosphere of the era.  
 
Throughout his book, Baer aims to represent Mehmed IV as a Ghazi sultan who 
were conquering the lands and converting the infidels for the glory of Islam. While 
doing this, he bases his argument mostly upon the contemporary historians’ works. The 
following lines from the book concisely summarize the main themes in the works of the 
Ottoman historians who wrote about the reign of Mehmed IV: 
 
“Abdi Pasha and other writers connected to the court, specifically 
those who wrote conquest books, promote the view that Mehmed IV was a 
mobile, active military leader and warrior breaking out of the harem cage in 
the palace of Istanbul and spending most of his reign in Edirne and Rumelia, 
the heartland of the empire, motivated by religious zeal, bringing war to the 
Christian enemy and promoting the image of a worthy Islamic sovereign.”44  
 
 
Baer seems to have felt a need to further investigate Ottoman historians of the 
second half of the seventeenth century in a more detailed manner in another article. 
According to him, especially after the death of Katip Çelebi (1609-1657), Kara 
Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi and Mehmed Hemdani Solakzade (d.1657), the previous 
Nasihatname literature totally disappeared. Instead, writers who wrote after 1658 began 
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 Marc David Baer, “Manliness, Male Virtue and History writing at the 17th-century Ottoman 
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to glorify the Sultan’s achievements and give importance to ghaza and Islamic zeal.45 In 
a similar vein, Baer claims that historians who wrote during this period, such as 
Mehmed Halife, Hasan Agha, Abdi Paşa, Hacı Ali, Yusuf Nabi, Vani Efendi46 and 
Mehmed Necati
47
 “imagined manliness in terms of bravery – manifested in hunting and 
waging war, labelled interchangeably ghaza or jihad – and Islamic zeal.”48 The only 
one exception for him during this period, which underlined “piety” by praising the 
Valide Sultan, is the Risale-i Kürd Hatib by Kürd Hatib.
49
  
 
Unless we question the laudations raised in this corpus and explore the broader 
political situation in the second half of the seventeenth century which might have 
affected how the Ottoman historians were perceived history, as Kunt states, “the reader 
is left with the impression that not only did the sultan come to believe in his own court 
histories but so did the author.”50 Considering the intellectual atmosphere of the time, 
we should pose the following set of questions: did nasihatname literature disappear 
during the Köprülü period as Baer argues, or did it evolve into (an) other form(s)? In 
this sense, can sufi literature be read as a genre taking up Nasihatnames’ role of social 
criticism? For instance, to what extent the critiques of Niyazi Mısri and ʿAbd al-Ghanī 
al-Nābulusī51 were marginal? 
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CHAPTER: 1  
ONE FACE OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY: GHAZI SULTAN 
 
 
 “The Ottomans created a political culture that drew on the 
multiplicity of options available in the early modern Islamic world. 
The unparalleled longevity of the Ottoman dynasty among Islamic 
dynasties was in part the result of its ability to accommodate and 
manipulate different political traditions, different concepts of 
sovereignty, and different bases of legitimation.”52  
 
 
As Peirce puts it, the Ottomans’ use of various instruments through the centuries 
enabled them to exonerate their genealogy or policy through which public images of the 
Ottoman sultans and Ottoman sovereignty could also be guaranteed. Since the sovereign 
came to power by hereditary rights in the dynastic states as in the case of Ottomans, the 
legitimacy of the state and of its monarch was generally imbricated.
53
 Taking into 
account these nested patterns; it would not be very difficult to assert that the political 
realities of the era affect the legitimization tools of the state. It means that considering 
the most canonical and lawful apparatus of the legitimacy which were well-suited to the 
political agenda of the state, various instruments or tactics were into use simultaneously. 
Although exploring all the aspects of the Ottoman concepts of sovereignty and 
legitimacy across time is beyond our scope of, yet, one feature of Ottoman conception 
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of sovereignty, the Ghazi origin, should be further discussed for our inquiry. It is a 
longest debated topic in the contemporary historiography on the early Ottoman polity.  
In this chapter, after surveying the modern historiographical debates revolving 
around the ghazi identity of the early Ottomans, I will try to inquire into the changing 
role of the sultans within the Ottoman political system characterized by patron-client 
relationships between the centralized bureaucracy in the capital and his servants in the 
provinces, which were consolidated through the well-supported patronage system, 
coextended the whole empire after the mid-sixteenth century. Additionally, I will look 
at the sultans ascending the throne after the death of Süleyman I, to whom the ghazi title 
were given, in order to connect the journey of ‘frozen legitimacy’ of the Ottoman 
sovereigns until when Mehmed IV got this title in 1658. In doing so, I will specifically 
focus on some debates in the recent Ottoman historiography concerning the early 
modern Ottoman court structure and changing dynamics of power within it over the 
years. Firstly, I will demonstrate some basic standpoints in the twentieth century 
historiography that brought the Ghazi identity of the Ottomans to the forefront for our 
inquiry. 
 
I.1. Ghazi debate in the contemporary Ottoman historiography 
 
The following excerpt concisely sums up the discussion in the first half of the 
twentieth century trying to present the most affective force that led to the Ottomans’ 
success at the end of the thirteenth century in the Bithynia region. 
 “In one generation the explanation for the question of the identity of 
the early Ottomans had been transformed from one which styled them as an 
admixture of Islamicized Byzantines and Turks (Gibbons); to Turks who 
attracted a large number of Byzantine converts to their banner due primarily 
to the heterodox form of Islam they practiced (Langer/Blake); to an 
amalgam of Turkish tribes and groups whose administrative skills were 
inherited from earlier Turkish states in Anatolia, the Seljuks, and the 
Ilhanids (Köprülü); and finally, to a group of dedicated Muslim gazis who 
came together for the express purpose of fighting and converting the 
Christian infidels in the border marches of northwest Anatolia (Wittek).”54  
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The last explanation given by Wittek around the 1930s occupied a very 
remarkable place in the contemporary Ottoman historiography for a long time. 
According to Wittek, Ottoman sultans preferred to use the Ghazi title for themselves 
from the very beginning to present themselves as warriors who pursue the religious duty 
incumbent duty upon them.
55
 He suggested that early Ottomans were bound by strong 
religious sentiments, which enabled them to devote themselves to fight with the infidels 
along the frontiers. The early Ottomans’ religious identity resulted in a strategic 
advantage among the other Turkic states, due to their status as a frontier society and to 
the Ghaza, an ideology of holy war, equipping them with the necessary religious 
justification. The ghaza ideology also provided them with moral values that as a long-
term result, enabled them to establish a strong state in the region. Wittek’s thesis about 
the early Ottomans remained unproblematized in the following forty years until the 
article of Halil Inalcık, in which he tries to reach a more inclusive explanation by 
incorporating both Wittek’s and Köprülü’s theses. That is to say, by bringing together 
both the tribal origins of the Ottomans and the role of holy war, he argued that ‘Ghazi-
Mercenary Bands’ was the most decisive factor behind the Ottomans’ success at the 
early stage of their coming out.
56
 In addition to this work, there have been written many 
other works concentrating on the discussion about the foundation of the Ottoman 
Empire from varying aspects
57
 but, the most comprehensive explanation with regard to 
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the emergence of the Ottoman State and the Ghazi identity of the early Ottomans is 
provided by the study of Cemal Kafadar. For him, “all the principalities were heirs to 
the political culture of Seijuk Anatolia […] but the Ottomans were much more 
experimental in reshaping it (state building) to need, much more creative in their 
bricolage of different traditions, be they Turkic, Islamic, or Byzantine.”58 Here, the 
bricolage means that early Ottomans incorporated different beliefs, traditions and 
societal norms to create a new civilization in which the inclusivity of the two religions, 
Christianity and Islam played a fundamental role in shaping a liquid and fluid culture. In 
this sense, the Ghazi identity of the early Ottomans constitutes only one aspect of this 
formation. On the other hand, in an important article, Colin Imber objected to a single-
sided usage of Ghazi term, saying that “in fourteenth-century Anatolia, […] as in the 
rest of the Islamic world, ghazi had juristic, rhetorical, ethical and mystical nuances, 
which varied according to the context in which it appeared. In popular usage it was 
ultimately to acquire a different meaning altogether.”59 If the term of Ghazi had 
different meaning in the first centuries of the Ottoman history, then when did it gain a 
specific meaning used for the title of Ottoman sultans as a means of canonical identity? 
 
Imber states that in the notion of “ghazi” as was used in the first Ottoman 
chronicles, which appeared during the reign of Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), like 
Aşıkpaşazade and Oruç, is embedded in the oral epic tradition attributing the ottoman 
sultan heroism and holy warriorship.
60
 On the other hand, at about the same time, at the 
end of the fifteenth century, a different type of history writing which derived not from 
the popular religious understanding but from a learned outlook crystallized, when the 
religious dimension of the Ottoman state ideology began to dominate the political 
structure. This canonical dimension of Ghazi identity of the Ottoman sultans continued 
to prevail the history writing throughout the sixteenth century with the help of the ulema 
and medrese-trained state officials who dominated both the intellectual life and the 
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imperial bureaucracy.
61
 The following lines trace the evolution of the ghazi images of 
the Ottoman sultans through the fifteenth century: 
 
“In the early fourteenth century, the Sultans adopted the title of gazi, 
an indication that, from the beginning, the dynasty regarded the pursuit of 
Holy War as its chief mission. Fifteenth-century chronicles preserve 
traditions which describe the early Sultans and their warriors in the same 
terms as the heroes of popular gazi epics. It is likely that these religious-
heroic ideals were the main feature of dynastic ideology during the 
fourteenth century. They survived in popular tradition after 1400, but by 
1500 they had largely given way to the orthodox Islamic concept of Holy 
War as the fulfillment of one of the obligations of the shari’ah. Earlier gazi 
tradition linked the Sultans to the figure of Ebu Muslim and other heroes of 
popular epics: by 1500 the annalists were promoting the dynasty as the 
greatest gazis since the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.”62 
 
 
I.2. The reign of Süleyman I: A Golden Age? 
 
 
 While the Sultan’s ghazi identity provides valid reason for the Ottoman conquest 
in its early stage, the physical absence of the sultans from the battlefield after the death 
of Süleyman I has been seen in the traditional historiography as the reason for the 
subsequentmilitary failures of the Ottoman state. Although there is no necessarily direct 
link between the physical absence of the Sultans from the battlefield and the Ottoman 
military defeats after the death of Süleyman I, as Karateke aptly demonstrates, there is 
today a collective memory among the people educated through the Turkish school 
system, whereby since the Ottoman Sultans kept themselves away from military activity 
and spent their time with pleasures, political and military “decline” of the Empire began 
to unravel.
63
 Undoubtedly, the glorious achievements of both Selim I and Suleyman I on 
the battlefields would have contributed such an understanding to emerge. Especially the 
legacy of Suleyman I was so mythical that his long sultanate has been perceived as the 
“Golden Age” of the Ottoman history. Similarly, some fundamental changes, 
fallaciously perceived as symptoms of decline occuring in different segments of the 
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empire, have been attributed to the post-Süleymanic era in the conventional Ottoman 
historiography. As Cemal Kafadar rightly argues, “anachronistic characterizations of 
particular personages or periods have thus become part of regular usage in the field and 
at times impede one's efforts to appreciate Ottoman consciousness in its own terms.”64 
This remark, actually, warns us to avoid superficial generalizations and stereotypical 
assumptions in history writing. Otherwise, conceiving of the empire during the forty-six 
year reign of Süleyman I, as a homogenous, unchanging and stable entity, as if there 
were a clear-cut consistency in the various spheres of the empire actually did exist, 
would be an insufficient evaluation for the Ottoman sixteenth century. So, I think that 
before moving on to the main issue, some points should be clarified for the reign of 
Süleyman I in order to better comprehend the structural changes in early modern 
Ottoman court and the role of the sultans within it.  
 
Throughout the late 1530s and 1540s in the Ottoman Empire, “we see an energetic 
compilation, codification, and modification of imperial ordinance, its regularization, 
universalization, and reconciliation with the dictates of the Holy Law, and also the rapid 
expansion and deepening of the machinery of government based on newly articulated 
principles of hierarchy, order, meritocracy, regularity, and replicability of basic 
structures based on function rather than on persons.”65 Undoubtedly, the struggle with 
the Safavids in the east and with the Habsburgs in the west paved the way for the 
emergence of such a situation. Due to external challenges, Süleyman felt the need to 
reformulate Ottoman sovereignty and imperial image during the first decades of his 
reign.
66
 When we come to the last years of Süleyman’s sultanate, on the other hand, we 
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face with a different imperial concept, in which regularization and institutionalization of 
state ideology were completed. These notions replaced the glorious achievements of 
Süleyman I of the first two decades in this relatively peaceful period in the international 
level through the rest of his reign. This relatively peaceful period between the different 
political and religious oriented states provided each state the opportunity to concentrate 
on the internal developments and take part in “religious reform, social disciplining, and 
the state building”67 process in the second half of the sixteenth century. However, 
internal issues created a problem for Süleyman I in the last decade of his reign this time. 
The execution of his son; Şehzade Mustafa in 1553, the struggle between his two sons 
for the throne and the fight between various constituencies affected Süleyman’s 
priorities to a considerable extent.  
In this connection, if we consider that the penultimate campaign that he personally 
led, the campaign of Nahcivan took place more than ten years before his final one, then, 
we should ask the following question. Why did he feel the need to attend this campaign 
in person? Most probably, since Süleyman had achieved greatness during the first two 
decades of his reign, as Woodhead suggests, he would have remained under pressure 
through the rest of his reign in order to maintain this reputation in the eyes of the 
people.
68
 Here, we have a chance to examine this inference from the account of Feridun 
Bey who took office under the incumbency of Sokullu Mehmed Paşa as a scribe during 
the campaign of Szigetvár whereby it is seen that for Suleyman, personal prestige, 
reputation and image had become a serious concern.
69
  
The role of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha during this war, on the other hand, evokes 
another important development within the Ottoman political order. Especially, acting as 
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a regent during this siege and his kingmaker process until Selim II ascended the throne 
safely made him, or rather his office, more crucial in the matters of the state.
70
 As Imber 
correctly puts, “[Süleyman’s] role on the campaign was symbolic rather than practical, 
and in this sense marked the end of the old concept of the Sultan as active warrior.”71 
This process, in fact, is the final evolution of Süleyman’s reign in which depersonalized 
bureaucratic functions of state affairs began to appear which carried certain limitations 
upon sultan’s personal rule and authority. So, it can be clearly asserted that the changing 
dynamics of power had already begun at the end of the reign of Süleyman I. In this 
regard, it is very probable to expect that the ideal image of the sultans is open to change. 
Leslie Peirce sums up this process as follows:  
“The ideal sovereign of the post-Süleymanic Ottoman Empire was a 
sedentary monarch whose defense of the faith was manifested more in 
demonstrations of piety, support of the holy law, and endowment of 
religious institutions than in personal participation in battle, and whose 
charisma was derived more from seclusion broken by ritual ceremony than 
from martial glory.”72  
 
 
By taking into consideration of the above-quoted excerpt, the new 
image of the sultans after the death of Süleyman I will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
 
I.3. Ghazi sultans after the death of Süleyman I 
 
After the death of Süleyman I in 1566, both Selim II (r. 1566-74) and Murad III (r. 
1574-1595) did not participate in any campaign personally. At this point, if we look at 
the contemporary Ottoman historians, we can see a significant variation in their 
interpretation as to the two Sultans’ military activity. What is striking about this 
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variation in their writings is that although Selim II did not command the army in the 
battlefield, there was no harsh criticism against his personal absence from the 
battlefield. For Karateke, there is a close correlation between the relatively successful 
campaigns during the reign of Selim II and in the writings of the Ottoman historians 
dating to that period. Since the Ottomans made a peaceful treaty with Habsburgs in 
1568 and Cyprus was taken from the Venetians in 1571, there was not any rising 
objection against the Sultan’s immobility.73 However, during the reign of Murad III, it 
can be observed that discontents about the physical absence of the sultan from the 
battlefield had risen.   
 
One of the most productive thinkers in the late sixteenth century in the Ottoman 
Empire, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali in his Nushatü’s-selatin (1581), propounds that if the 
Sultan had actively taken part in the campaign and managed the army in the eastern 
front, the Ottomans would have seized all the Iranian lands. In a similar way, in the 
Şecaatname (1586), Asafi took this idea a step further and claimed that all of the eastern 
lands including beyond Iran would have been taken by the Ottoman Empire.
74
 However, 
if we consider that there were also some military achievements during the reign of 
Murad III, such as the capturing of Tabriz 1585 and the signing of a peace treaty with 
Iran in 1590,
75
 it would be very difficult to link this change in the writings of the 
Ottoman historians merely to the actual military achievements in the battlefield. At this 
juncture, there must be a close connection between the political atmosphere of the 
period in question and the writings of the Ottoman historians.  
 
Since Sokullu Mehmed Pasha continued to hold the grand vizierate during the 
short reign of Selim II, this period has been perceived as the continuation of the 
previous period in some ways in which patronage relations and household affiliations 
were still mostly under his control. Mustafa Ali and Asafi, whose careers developed in 
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the same direction after the death of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, tried to find new political 
connections under these circumstances. Their factional positions and competition 
between the different political cliques in the court must have influenced their writing.
76
 
In this point, to better inquire about the historical writing after the death of Süleyman I 
and analyze these political cliques, it is very crucial to look at the Şehname tradition in 
the Ottoman history writing because without paying attention to this genre, any 
argument would lack a concrete basis. 
 
Beginning with the last decade of Süleyman’s reign, a particular style of history 
writing came into being. Although the general histories composed during the reign of 
Beyazıd II were aimed to enhance the public image of the Sultan,77 the appointment of 
Arifi and his successors as Şehnameci marks a new phase for the Ottoman history 
writing in the mid-sixteenth century. The newly developing of history writing whose 
composers received a regular salary
78, as Fleischer argues, is “...the first attempt by the 
dynasty to assert direct control of the literary expression of historical ideology and 
imperial image.”79  
 
Covering the years of 1520-1555, Süleymanname is the first example in Ottoman 
historical writing in which word and image were combined.
80
 The works of Arif and 
Eflatun, the first two Şehnameci of Süleyman I, did not included a world history solely, 
but sacred history as well, in which Süleyman “is portrayed as the second person in 
history (both sacred and human) after the Islamic prophet Muḥammed, who combined 
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perfectly in himself the qualities of a political and spiritual leader.”81 The Şehname 
tradition reached a peak with the partnership of Seyyid Lokman and Nakkaş Osman in 
their illustrated histories composed during the reign of Selim II and Murad III. 
However, there is a significant difference between the two generations they represented 
respectively in terms of both the style of writing and the political expectations of the 
authors. While the works of Arif and Eflatun were effective sources for propaganda that 
promoted the saintly image of Süleyman I, albeit produced for private use, Seyyid 
Lokman’s works were composed specifically for the aim of dissemination.82 Therefore, 
without paying attention to the patronage relations during the second half of the 
sixteenth century, it would be very difficult to situate these works into the Ottoman 
canonical writing.  
 
Emine Fetvacı, who worked on the changing dynamics of patronage system in the 
illustrated books produced between the years of 1566 and 1617, asserts that the 
gazanames composed in the 1580s are connected with two historical developments. 
First of all, after the death of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, the office of grand vizierate was 
interchangeably passed from one official to the other, namely, between Ferhad Pasha, 
Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha, Sinan Pasha and Siyavuş Pasha during the years 1579-95. 
Secondly, apart from Siyavuş Pasha, the other three officials were actively taking part in 
the Ottoman-Safavid war as commanders, so their activities conveyed the message of 
heroism to the court which glorified their own achievements.
83
 According to Fetvacı, 
the power struggles among the various cliques within the court affected the contents of 
the illustrated books produced during the reign of Murad III by saying that: 
 
“In the context of Murad III's court, between the sultan's interest in 
books and history and the transitional nature of the power balances, all of 
these manuscripts served as powerful agents of change: they were perceived 
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to not only record the events of their time but were also intended to have an 
effect on the careers of their authors, patrons, and protagonists.”84 
 
 
While the different political factions in the court affected historical significantly, 
Murad III had a keen interest in the process of book production. He especially raised 
objection towards earlier drafts of the Şemailname in which “his contemporary Gazi 
Giray Khan II (1588–1607) could be viewed as more of an ideal ruler than himself—an 
active and successful military leader, a capable and involved administrator in his own 
territories.”85 The sultan’s interference, and other broader political dynamics and 
processes, according to Baki Tezcan, “has to be interpreted within the context of Murad 
III's absolutist politics that created strong reactions from the legalists who were 
concerned with placing certain limits on the political authority of the Ottoman sultan.”86 
Although examining that to what extent this interpretation suits the political realities of 
the Ottoman Empire at that time can be debatable, it is clear that the priorities of the 
Ottoman historiographers, while they were depicting the sultan, changed considerably. 
We can observe this development in the content of the some illustrated books. In this 
regard, Woodhead claims that the historical works written at the end of the sixteenth 
century gave special importance to a new image of the sultan rather than the two older 
ones the Ghazi warrior and the upholder of Sunni orthodoxy. The following excerpt 
simply refers to a third image: 
 
“…the details illustrating each point in the original Şema’ilname show 
the various sultans engaged primarily in essential statecraft—combating 
heresy and instability, ensuring fair collection of taxes and customs duties, 
maintaining strong military and administrative organizations. The gazi 
image has no place in this presentation; military strength is almost taken for 
granted. Instead, the sultans exercise a supervision of affairs which could be 
done as easily by a palace-based sultan as by a physically active, ubiquitous 
leader.”87 
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If we have also taken into consideration that this representation shows “…the 
uninterrupted succession of Ottoman dynastic lineage from one sultan’s reign to the 
next”88, it would not be very difficult to imagine that the image of the Ghazi became 
more difficult to highlight due to fact that Ottoman Sultans did not join military 
campaign for thirty years after the death of Süleyman I. But, it does not mean that the 
Ghazi sultans totally disappeared in Ottoman history. 
 
In addition to changes in the dynamics of power, the peculiarities military of the 
era’s military techniques affected the sultan’s absence from the battleground to a 
considerable extent. Both physical barriers and environmental constraints in the long 
war between the Ottomans and Habsburgs (1593-1606) showed the importance of a 
siege war in the frontiers.
89
 The necessities of the warfare system brought about 
important changes in the governmental system of the Ottoman Empire. In this manner, 
the direct participation of the Sultan to these long-lasting siege wars would have been 
seen unreasonable because his physical absence in the capital for a long time would 
have triggered other political problems. Under these circumstances, since the Grand 
vizier commanded the army on the battlefield, there arose a need to appoint a deputy to 
perform state affairs in the name of Grand viziers.
90
 “The tension between the grand 
vezir as army commander and his Deputy in Istanbul, or between the grand vezir in 
Istanbul and a vezir of lower rank as army commander” 91 emerged during the reign of 
Mehmed III, especially before his only campaign, Eğri 1596. Karateke summarizes this 
tension as follows:  
 
“If the grand vezir was sent as commander, his deputy (kaimmakam) 
in Istanbul would purposely withhold further soldiers and provisions from 
the army in order to cause the grand vezir to be unsuccessful, in the hope of 
damaging his reputation and ultimately replacing him. If another vezir was 
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appointed commander, the grand vezir himself would not want him to 
succeed and thereby become a possible contender for his own position. A 
higher authority such as the sultan himself would be a solution to all these 
problems, suggested Sinan Paşa.”92 
 
Whether Mehmed III’s decision to take actively part in this campaign originated 
from Sinan Paşa’s suggestion or the religious sanction from his tutor, Hoca Sa'deddin, 
believing that Mehmed III’s physical existence in the battlefield would end up with the 
success is another concern, but at the end, Mehmed III personally led the army to 
Hungary. Although he attempted to retreat the army from the campaign after the fall of 
Eğri castle, after receiving the news that the army of Habsburg was approaching, the 
Ottoman army gained a victory at the battle of Hacova in 1596.
93
 After this campaign, 
Mehmed III attained the title of Ghazi Sultan
94
 and his victorious entry into Istanbul 
was illustrated in the book of Şahname-i Sultan Mehmed-i Salis composed by 
Talikizade Mehmed.
95
  
 
After the death of Mehmed III, Ahmed I (r. 1603-1607) ascended the throne. 
During his sultanate, again, he did not command the army in the battlefield
96
 as in the 
case of Mustafa’s two short sultanates (1617-18 and 1622-23). If we look at the some 
contemporary accounts written during the reign of Ahmed I, we can see that their 
authors did not adopt a critical view on the matter of removal of the sultan from the 
battlefield. For example, there were no harsh criticisms leveled against the immobility 
of Ahmed I in the Habname composed by Veysi and Zübdetü’t  evarih of Mustafa Safi, 
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both of them were written around the 1610s.
97
 According to Karateke, while the 
physical retreat of the sultans from commanding the army were serious of concern in 
some sources composed at the end of the sixteenth century, the same critical tendency is 
not found in most of the works written during the course of the seventeenth century. He 
argues that “...the debate and the sensitive public opinion about the sultan's going on 
campaign were conrext-specific. The debate should therefore be understood in its 
contemporary context, and not necessarily as a continuing issue.”98 
 
On the other hand, for some historians, Ottoman court structure gradually evolved 
along a different path, in which decision-making process came into the hands of a few 
people at the end of the sixteenth century, in contrast to the previous period.
99
 Günhan 
Börekçi, for example, argues that “what differentiates Ahmed I’s reign from those of 
earlier sultans is that the power struggles within the Ottoman polity had shifted from a 
larger setting, which had included the provincial princely households, to the narrower 
domain of Topkapı Palace and Istanbul.”100 This point brings us to the absolutism 
debate in the Ottoman Empire concerning the reign of Osman II. 
 
The reign of Osman II (1618-1622) has been exploited enormously in the recent 
Ottoman historiography in many ways. Since he was the first Sultan murdered in 
Ottoman history, his short reign attracted considerable attention. If we take into account 
that he personally led the army to Hotin, despite the fact that the attempt itself was 
politically unnecessary,
101
 his motives for the campaign become important for our topic. 
Piterberg, who studied the regicide of Osman II, by focusing on the different 
interpretations of the Ottoman historians, claims that “Osman II tried to revive the 
image of the gazi- or warrior-sultan—the ruler of a frontier-oriented state who not only 
conducted raids across the Islamic border but more generally left the palace frequently 
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and exposed himself to personal contact with his subjects.”102 Similarly, Baki Tezcan 
argues that by actively taking part in Hotin campaign, Osman II attempted to restrain 
the power of the vizier’s households through his absolutist policies and measures.103 
The two modern historians’ works touch upon the similar concept that the ideal sultan 
as a warrior who fights for the glory of Islam did not totally disappear both in the 
writings of the Ottoman historians and in the actions of the Sultan himself. We have a 
chance to affirm the case from the last work of the Ottoman Şahname tradition 
composed by Ganizade Nadiri, namely, Şehname-i Nadiri. In that work, the depiction of 
Osman II either when he was commanding the army or he was on the battlefield well 
represented the image of the previous ghazi sultan.
104
  
 
From another viewpoint, military mobility of Murad IV supported the idea that he 
has been accepted as the last conqueror sultan in Ottoman history by a certain group of 
scholars in   traditional Ottoman historiography. Although the first years of his sultanate 
passed with the regency of his mother, Kösem Sultan,
105
 Murad IV attempted to actively 
participate in the Revan campaign (1635) and Bagdad campaign (1638) and took the 
ghazi title.
106
 Once again, there is no attempt in the writings of the Ottoman historians in 
which Ibrahim I (r. 1640-1648) was depicted as a Ghazi sultan.  
 
To sum up, although most of the Sultans did not actively participate in the 
military campaigns after the death of Süleyman I, Mehmed III, Osman II and Murad IV 
had at least once personally led the army in the battlefield. ‘Frozen legitimacy’, though 
it may be related to the Ghazi identity of the Ottoman sultans, did not completely 
disappear during the post-Süleymanic period. Whenever the sultan led the army 
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personally, Ottoman historians also emphasized the ghazi title of the Sultan, 
emphasizing their duty as warriors of the faith, but the magnificence of the title lies in 
its symbolic meaning rather than signifying the previous ghazi image in real terms. 
Mehmed IV, on the other hand, took the ghazi title with the Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658 
prior to actually taking part in a campaign. It distinguished him from his predecessors 
through the post-Süleymanic age, because by ascribing a religious dimension, this title 
was used as a legitimate tool against the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa. In order to 
comprehensively inquire the political situations around the time when Mehmed IV took 
the ghazi title in 1658, firstly, a brief examination of his early reign should be pursued. 
After that, I will try to inquire the factors why the ruling elites decide to entitle Mehmed 
IV as “Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han” with a Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658.  
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CHAPTER: 2 
DEPICTING MEHMED IV AS GHAZI IN 1658 
 
In this chapter, after elaborating the political situation around the mid-seventeenth 
century in the Ottoman Empire, I will try to inquire the factors that explained the ruling 
elites' decision to entitle Mehmed IV as “Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han” with the 
Şeyhülislam fatwa issued in 1658. I suggest that the reason behind the case lies in the 
rebellion of Abaza Hasan Paşa, who demanded the dismissal of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. 
Here, I argue that in the face of Hasan Paşa’s revolt, Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title was used 
as a legitimization tool by the ruling elites on the ground that he interrupted the “holy 
war” of the sultan waging in the European fronts. I propose that the importance of the 
Ghazi title given to Mehmed IV in such a way is twofold. Firstly, it signifies that for the 
first time in Ottoman history a sultan officially took the Ghazi title. That is to say, 
although there were some literal works in which the ghazi title was rhetorically used for 
some sultans with the intent of praising their personality, Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title is a 
unique case because he took it with a religious fatwa, which distinguished him from his 
predecessors in a fundamental way. Secondly, this event symbolizes the actual 
completion of the hegemony of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, because after getting the 
support of the Ottoman ruling elites against the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa, Köprülü 
neutralized the most serious challenge threatening his leadership. At this juncture, the 
consensus among the Ottoman ruling elites, which agreed upon with Mehmed IV’s 
Ghazi title, paved the way for the suppression of Abaza Hasan Paşa revolt. However, 
without understanding the political situation around the mid-seventeenth century, it 
would be hard to explain why the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV in 1658. Thus, 
34 
 
after giving background information about the first years of Mehmed IV’s sultanate, I 
will dwell on two important international problems that the Ottoman Empire had faced 
in the mid-seventeenth century, namely the war with the Venice and the revolt of 
George Rakozcy II. Lastly and most importantly, I will put emphasis on Abaza Hasan 
Paşa’s revolt whereupon the fatwa was issued to designate Mehmed IV as Ghazi.  
 
II.1. Political situation around the mid-seventeenth century 
 
When Mehmed IV ascended the throne at the age of seven in 1648, both the elder 
Queen Mother (Kösem Sultan) and Mehmed IV’s mother (Turhan Sultan) were still 
alive. The first three years of Mehmed IV’s sultanate, which was called the “Sultanate 
of the Ağas” by some historians,107 passed with the domination of Kösem Sultan over 
the state affairs, competing always with her main rival in the harem, Hatice Turhan 
Sultan, in the matter of acting as regent to the sultan. The struggle between the two 
Valide Sultans, stimulated by the different circles of powers around them, especially by 
the Ağas who were divided into parties and formed various alliances with the different 
harem factions, dominated the political scene until the death of Kösem Sultan in 1651. 
In an attempt to enthrone her son, Süleyman, instead of Mehmed IV, the assassination 
of Kösem Sultan in 1651 was orchestrated by the factions of Hatice Turhan Sultan in 
the court. The death of Kösem Sultan accelerated an array of retaliations in Istanbul 
resulting in the execution of some janissary members who took sides with the elder 
valide sultan and the elimination of the harem faction led by Kösem sultan and her 
supporters.
108
 The problem of regency, which culminated in the first years of Mehmed 
IV’s reign, on the other hand, gives some clues about the political life of the Ottoman 
court in the mid-seventeenth century. As Peirce comments on this issue: 
“It demonstrates that the palace was not a political monolith. It also 
suggests the complexity of links between inner palace politics and the outer 
world of administration. Furthermore, the competing claims to legitimate 
authority by the mother as well as the grandmother of the sultan are another 
indication of the degree to which the role of the valide sultan as guardian 
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and representative of the sultan had been institutionally secured by the mid-
seventeenth century. Indeed, in this period when there were no adult male 
members to represent the dynasty, the intergenerational competition 
between the two valide sultans appears to be a kind of continuation of the 
tension surrounding the succession that had previously existed between 
fathers and sons.”109 
 
Although the political role of the valide sultans as regent seems to be accepted as 
a matter of fact in the mid-seventeenth century, it can be clearly argued that it was not, 
however, a long term phenomenon. The appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1656 
with extraordinary powers indicates this circumstance to a certain extent. As Peirce 
argues, “Turhan Sultan's relinquishing of direct control of government [...] was 
undoubtedly in part a recognition that the natural span of her regency was coming to an 
end.”110 The underlying reason behind circumstance lies on the difficulties that the 
Ottomans were facing at the time. 
Most notably, the war with Venice began to deteriorate the state finances for 
several years, the result of which was a couple of serious military revolts in Istanbul, 
leading to the execution of many state officials and the displacement of several Grand 
Viziers. The most serious military revolt broke out around the mid-seventeenth century 
in Istanbul, namely the Vaka-i Vakvakiye, arising from nearly the same reason as in the 
previous ones; the payment given to the soldiers in debased coinage.
111
 Hatice Turhan 
Sultan, who was continuing to be involved in the state affairs by acting as regent on 
behalf of Mehmed IV, seems to have a need to appoint a powerful man who would 
cease and overcome this chaotic atmosphere through resolute actions. For Turhan 
Sultan, this powerful man was Köprülü Mehmed Paşa who held various offices during 
his incumbency and lastly turned to Istanbul in 1656 with a group of people came 
together under the new Grand Vizier Boynu Yaralı Mehmed Paşa, who assured Köprülü 
that he was going to find a new post for him. While he was awaiting a new post, 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa attended some meetings in which the difficulties that the 
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Ottoman state had been facing were discussed, including the Venetians' blockade of the 
Dardanelles. In time, the supporters of Köprülü began to put their plan into words about 
the appointment of him as Grand Vizier instead of Boynu Yaralı Mehmed Paşa. Their 
requests were welcomed by Hatice Turhan Sultan and Mehmed IV. In this sense, the 
indecisive attitude of the current Grand Vizier in the imperial council concerning the 
state affairs pushed them to appoint Köprülü as Grand Vizier.
112
 Further to accepting 
this post and before commencing it, Köprülü offered a kind of contract to assure that 
nobody would interfere in the precautions that he aimed to apply. The following 
proposal suggested by him was accepted by the ruling elites and he was appointed as the 
Grand Vizier with absolute authority, a perk which had not been given to any of his 
predecessors for a long time. The following conditions were the preconditions of 
Köprülü for accepting the post of the Grand Vizierate.  
 
“l) that all his requests be granted by the sultan, and that nothing 
contrary to such requests be sustained; 2) that no pressure be allowed on the 
grand vezir from any source in the granting of any office, so that the most 
deserving men might be employed; for, Köprülü insisted, such unreasonable 
requests are the cause of all disturbances; 3) that no vezir or other official 
(vekil) be allowed to emerge to a position that might rival or impinge upon 
the grand vezir's power and Independence of action; and 4) that no ill-willed 
backbiters be allowed to slander the grand vezir.”113 
 
As soon as Köprülü became the Grand Vizier and guaranteed the power in his 
hands with the contract, he successfully eliminated the various circles of power in the 
capital by applying various measures. His first action was expel the very dominant 
figures of the Kadızadelis to Cyprus, including the spiritual leader of the movement at 
the time, Üstüvani Mehmed Efendi.
114
 Likewise, he executed the Orthodox Patriarch in 
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Istanbul, claiming that he encouraged Christians to revolt against Ottoman authority in 
Wallachia.
115
 More important than these, he appointed his supporters to important 
offices in a short time after he came to power.
116
 Although the threats of opposition 
groups against the almost absolute power of Köprülü continued, he succeeded in 
maintaining and securing stability in Istanbul to a certain extent, but this time he had to 
engage with the Venetians because the war with Venice over the island of Crete had 
been continuing and they had already blocked the Dardanelles by taking Limni and 
Bozcaada Islands.  
 
II.2. The war with Venice  
 
“In the autumn of 1644, a ship set sail from Istanbul with a number of 
notables on board, among them the chief of the harem Sünbüllü Agha and 
Bursali Mehmet Efendi, who had just been appointed to the judgeship of 
Mecca. The ship stopped at Rhodes, where sailors warned them about a 
pirate boat lying in wait. Mehmet Efendi, however, insisted that they must 
reach Egypt in time for the haj, so the boat departed. Somewhere in the 
vicinity of Crete it was set upon by Maltese pirates. Sixty people were taken 
hostage (among them Mehmet Efendi) and the rest were killed, including 
Sünbüllü Agha, whose enormous treasure was shared out among the pirates. 
When he heard the news, Sultan Ibrahim accused the Venetians of having 
given safe harbor and aid to the Maltese in Crete.”117 
 
The trigger effect of launching a military campaign against the Venetians on the 
Crete Island can be seen in the above-mentioned excerpt. If we consider both the 
political situation of Europe and the domestic politics of the Ottoman court, it would be 
hard to believe that it is the only explanation, since although there had already been 
pirate activity in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman fleet before the incident, the 
Ottomans had never taken the risk to launch a war against Venice, and most of the 
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conflicts were tried to be resolved peacefully. So, declaring a war against the Venetians 
“can be interpreted as an indication of Ottoman self-confidence, restored after the 
successes of Murad IV against Iran.”118  
For the Ottomans, as long as the war in the eastern frontier with the Safavids 
continued, it would be very difficult to open a new front in Europe. However, this 
obstacle disappeared after signing of a peace treaty in 1639 with the Safavids, which 
came after the two successful campaigns of Murad IV resulting in taking Revan (1635) 
and reconquest of Bagdad in 1638. On the Other hand, the peace treaty presented an 
opportunity for the Ottomans to direct their attention to the western fronts. On the other 
hand, actively involved with the Thirty Years’ War, Venice was now an assailable 
enemy for the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean region. Another development 
within the court can also be added to the Ottomans’ willingness to attack Crete. After 
the death of Kemankeş Mustafa Paşa in 1643, who was known to be cautious about 
military expenditures, considering that these kinds of military actions would bring extra 
burden on the state treasury, the attitudes of Cinci Hoca and Kapudan Yusuf Pasha, who 
were disposed to declare war against Venice would have prevailed on Ibrahim I’s 
decision against the policy of the Grand Vizier Sultanzade Mehmed Pasha, who was the 
advocate of remaining in peace with Venice.
119
 
Ottomans carried a quick success in the initial phase of the siege. In 1645, they 
easily captured the second biggest city in the Crete, Chania, and then took Rethymnon, 
in the following year. After capturing some other citadels along the coastline, the 
Ottoman-Venetian war began to spread to Eastern Europe, resulting in clashes in many 
fronts, Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Dardanelles. Venetians responded to the Ottomans’ 
attacks on the Dalmatian coast with the conquest of the Ottoman citadel in Bosnia 
known as Clissa.
120
 Venetian’s counterattack must have forced the Ottomans to take 
measures against the naval power of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean region. 
Especially after the appointment of Sofu Mehmed Paşa as Grand Vizier and Voynuk 
Ahmed Paşa as Kapudan Pasha, the state officials began to seek a new way to 
ameliorate the condition of the navy, in order to break the Venetian blockade of 
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Dardanelles. For this purpose, the construction of galleons began to in 1648.
121
 
However, these ships were not a successful experiment for the Ottoman navy, for even 
though they reinforced the fleet, they were still defeated by the Venetians. 
After the three years that passed with several confrontations, the Ottoman-
Venetian war over Crete entered a new phase in the following years. During these years 
some attempts to reach a peace agreement came into being, despite the fact that the 
naval battles between these two states were still raging on. The year 1655, on the other 
hand, witnessed the first victory of Ottoman galleons against the Venetians under the 
command of Surnazen Mustafa Paşa. However, most of these ships were captured by 
the Venetians in 1656, paving the way for the conquering the islands of both Limni and 
Bozcaada by the Venetians.
122
 These two islands in the entrance of the Dardanelles were 
not only important for their strategic locations, which enabled Ottomans to carry out the 
military aid to the siege of Crete, but also due to their role in isolating the Ottoman ships 
in the eastern Mediterranean region, blocking the food supply of Istanbul coming from 
Egypt. Actually, the occupation of these two Islands took place on the eve of the 
appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as Grand Vizier in 1656. Thus, the first thing for 
Köprülü to deal with was to break the Venetians’ blockade of the Dardanelles. 
Therefore, after making a preparation throughout the winter, he initiated a naval 
campaign against the Venetians’ fleet to break the blockade and to conquer the strategic 
Islands in the entrance of the strait. In the following year, the Ottoman navy 
successfully repulsed the Venetians’ fleet and retook the Bozcaada and Limni Islands.123 
The successful naval battle pushed Köprülü to take further action against the Venetians 
in the eastern fronts. Kunt states Köprülü’s intention towards the Venetians as follows:   
 “... Köprülü's ultimate objective in the war with Venice was to force 
the Republic to surrender Candia, which had been holding out for more than 
a decade despite the fact that most of Crete was held by Ottoman forces. To 
achieve this objective Köprülü planned a land campaign to strike at the 
Dalmatian and home territories of the Republic in the spring of 1658.”  
However, “...circumstances forced Köprülü's attention elsewhere, and 
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because the 1658 campaign was in the end directed against Transylvania it 
is often overlooked that the initial preparations were against Venice.”124  
 
This problem constitutes the second international confrontation of the Ottomans in 
the mid-seventeenth century, the revolt of George Rakoczy II, prince of Transylvania, 
who tried to take advantage from the political conditions in the Eastern Europe in his 
favor.   
 
II.3. The revolt of George Rakoczy II 
 
The revolt of Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj, against the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648 evolved into a war between Russia and 
Poland over the Ukraine. At first, the Ottomans tried to carry out a balance policy 
towards these two powers, but firstly the Crimean Tatars and then the Ottomans began 
to support Ukrainian Cossacks, expecting to gain a new dependent ruler in the Black 
Sea region.
125
  However, Xmel’nyc’kyj’s alliance with Russia changed the policy of the 
Tatars and the Ottomans in support of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which 
later was invaded by the Swedish kingdom. The reason behind the change of policy 
towards the revolt lies in the fact that “a weak Commonwealth on their north-western 
frontier suited the Ottomans far better than a swathe of territory seized by an energetic 
vassal and held with Swedish support.”126 
The political situation in Eastern Europe at the time, from which the anti-polish 
alliance took a considerable advantage, paved the way for the revolt of George Rakoczy 
II, who had been the prince of Transylvania since the year 1648. Rakoczy tried to 
benefit from both the weakness of the Polish state, which had difficulties originated 
from the Cossacks revolt and Sweden's invasion, and from the fact that the Ottomans 
were at war with the Venetians. Trying to gain the support of the Ottoman vassals, 
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namely Wallachia and Moldavia, Rakoczy intended to increase his role in the Eastern 
European politics by aiming to exercise sovereignty over Poland and Hungary. In 
response to Rakoczy’s revolt, Ottomans took measures to suppress the revolt before the 
situation would become worse. “On one hand they pressured the Transylvanian Diet to 
depose Rakoczy and elect in his stead a nobleman by the name of Ferenc Rhedey; on 
the other hand the Crimean Han was instructed to attack Rakoczy and to drive his army 
out of Poland.”127 However, these maneuvers did not force Rakoczy to retreat from his 
policy, which provoked Köprülü to take military action against his revolt. In 1658, he 
personally joined the Ottoman forces, which were previously commanded by the 
governor of Özi province, Melek Ahmed Pasha, in order to launch an expedition against 
this revolt. In the same year, Köprülü marched to Yanova which had one of the 
strongest fortresses in south-western Transylvania region. The Ottoman army conquered 
the castle after a short siege. Then, with the help of the Crimean Tatars, the Ottomans 
occupied the capital of the principality, Alba Julia. Although Rakoczy managed to 
escape from this campaign, Köprülü suppressed the rebellion and appointed a new 
prince for the Transylvanian principality.
128
 Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s successful 
attempts against the Venetians and the revolt of Rakoczy in the north-western frontier 
were not well welcomed in Anatolia, however. Abaza Hasan Paşa and a number of 
Anatolian governors raised their voice against the absolute rule of Köprülü.  
 
 
II.4. The mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa 
 
It can be easily argued that the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa was the most 
threatening attempt on Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s rising power over the state affairs. 
Neither the war with Venice nor the revolt of Rakoczy worried Köprülü that much 
because this revolt directly targeted his absolute power. In the same vein, this revolt is 
also important for the current thesis on the ground that Mehmed IV received the Ghazi 
title after the revolt had broken out. In the following lines, after briefly narrating this 
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revolt, I will try to examine the historical context in which the Ottoman ruling elites 
agreed to designate Mehmed IV as the Ghazi sultan. In doing so, I will also criticize the 
weak description of the event in the work of Marc David Baer.
129
 
Being appointed as governor of Aleppo, İbşir Mustafa Paşa raised some 
objections to the Ottoman court in an effort to put his own programme into practice that 
aimed to ameliorate the ill management in the government. At first, his demands were 
not welcomed. However, when the Porte received the news that İbşir Mustafa Paşa was 
on the road to march on Istanbul, he was appointed as the Grand Vizier in 1654. A few 
months later, he was executed in consequence of the rebellion led by the Janissaries and 
cavalry corps in the capital.
130
 Yet, his two supporters; Seydi Ahmed Paşa and Abaza 
Hasan Paşa maintained discordant attitudes and when Köprülü Mehmed Paşa came to 
power, they began to raise their objections. In response to the two lieutenants of Hasan 
Paşa, on the other hand, Köprülü took some precautions against their possible discontent 
attitudes that might have threatened his authority. Firstly, Köprülü tried to minimize the 
threat that might have come from Seydi Ahmed Paşa by sending him to the Bosnian 
front to fight against the Venetians. However, the opposition of Hasan Paşa was more 
difficult to cope with because of his power coming from the other provincial governors 
in Anatolia as well.
131
 
As I have mentioned before, while Köprülü was preparing to launch a military 
campaign against the Venetians along the Dalmatian coast so as to force them to 
relinquish Crete, the revolt of Rakoczy broke out. In return, the campaign was directed 
against the Transylvania region to suppress this revolt before the situation would 
become worse. As a result, Hasan Paşa was called together with the other governors in 
Anatolia to combine their soldiers with the central forces of the Ottoman army that was 
personally led by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa.132 However, procrastinating from taking part 
in the campaign, Hasan Paşa corresponded with other governors in Anatolia to form an 
opposition block against Köprülü’s rule. With the participation of various governors, 
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including the governors of Damascus and Anatolia, meaning Tayyarzade Ahmed Paşa 
and Can Mirza Paşa, nearly thirty thousand men gathered in Konya.133 At first, they did 
not openly put forward their intention which can be seen in the letter of Hasan Paşa sent 
to the sultan, in which it is reported that Hasan Paşa was about to come to Istanbul with 
his soldiers.
134
 Meanwhile, being deprived from the most of the Anatolian forces, 
Köprülü departed from Edirne to launch a campaign against the Transylvania before the 
arrival of the winter. While Köprülü was on the road with the central army, on the other 
hand, the Konya group held a meeting, whereupon they came to the conclusion that as 
long as the Grand Vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, was executed, they were not going to 
attend any campaign.
135
 Herein, they were very certain at their concern that if they 
attended this campaign, Köprülü would execute all of the members of this group, as he 
did before against his enemies.
136
  
As in the case of previous revolts, in which the rebelling parties had tried to 
depend their actions upon a legitimate ground, whether by obtaining a Şeyhülislam 
fatwa or garnering the support of a group of the ulema,
137
 the members of Abaza Hasan 
Paşa revolt also attempted to build their action on a legitimate ground. They designated 
themselves as “Cünud-ı Müslimin, meaning Muslim soldiers, who were gathered in 
order to chasten the sultanate in line with the law.
138
 Similarly, they also blamed 
Köprülü on the ground that he actually interrupted their holy war which had been 
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directing against the Venetians over the Crete Island.
139
 More important than these, their 
target turned towards the Ottoman state, meaning the sultan himself. This means that 
their intention went beyond demanding the execution of Grand Vizier and reached to 
the point of creating their own states, which can be seen in Abaza Hasan Paşa’s own 
words: “‘From now on, consider us as implacable a foe as the Shah of Iran; they [the 
Sultan] shall have Rumeli and we Anatolia.’”140  
To what extent did their claims reflect the reality is open to debate, but in 
response to such sort of actions, ruling elites began to raise their own legitimacy 
devices. As the rebellions did before, this time, the Porte defined themselves as 
“Muslim soldiers”, who were detained by these rebels when they were engaging in 
making a holy war against the infidels, by issuing a fatwa, which was then sent to 
Istanbul to influence the public opinion against the rebellion.
141
 Having understood that 
their intent came to a serious level, Mehmed IV summoned Köprülü Mehmed Paşa from 
Transylvania region immediately to take an action against this revolt in Anatolia.
142
 
Köprülü received this order when the siege of Yanova castle came to an end. After 
receiving these news he moved to Edirne, where the imperial council was gathered with 
the participation of high ranked state officials, including viziers, the Şeyhülislam, 
janissary ağas, kazaskers and the ‘ayans.143 In the council, soldiers and the state officials 
came to an agreement to act together against Abaza Hasan Paşa. Among these officials, 
especially the soldiers raised questions concerning the religious legitimacy of fighting 
against other Muslims. By giving a reference to Fetavay-ı Bezzaziye, written by 
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Bezzazi, a hanefi scholar who lived in the fifteenth century,
144
 this concern was resolved 
with the Şeyhülislam fatwa.145 
In fact, this point necessitates a brief look at the previous justification devices 
used by the early Ottomans in the matter of using holy war as a backbone of the 
territorial gains that were taken from Muslims. In this regard, since Ottomans attacked 
the Muslim territories, it would have been very difficult to label these campaigns for the 
sake of the glory of Islam. For that reason, the Ottomans fabricated various instruments 
to overcome this difficulty. Colin Imber concisely summarizes these devices as follows:  
“Firstly, the Ottoman chronicles of the late fifteenth century tend to 
present Ottoman conquests in fourteenth and early fifteenth-century 
Anatolia as peaceful acquisitions without force of arms, and thus exonerate 
the Ottoman dynasty from the charge of waging war against Muslims. A 
second device which these chronicles adopted was to justify such wars as a 
religious obligation, on the grounds that the other Muslim rulers of Anatolia 
had cooperated with the infidels, and thus distracted the Ottomans from 
their sacred task of gaza. [...] Another technique was to portray the sultans’ 
Muslim enemies as ‘oppressing’ Muslims, thus making the ‘removal of 
oppression’ obligatory for the Ottomans.”146 
  
Similarly, although Abaza Hasan Paşa was not a ruler of any state at the time, but 
had an idea to create his own state in Anatolia, we can apparently see that the Ottoman 
rulers manifested similar devices, especially using the last two, to obtain a justification 
tool to be used to suppress his revolt. All of these precautions, mobilization and 
legitimization attempts obviously show that both Mehmed IV and Köprülü Mehmed 
Paşa took the revolt seriously.  
However, the last but most important detail in the imperial council, which 
convened in Edirne two days after Köprülü’s arrival (15 October 1658),147 is the scene 
that the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV. The only contemporary account, which 
recounts an anecdote about the designating of Mehmed IV as Ghazi sultan, is Tarih-i 
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Gilmani by Mehmed Halife. As he was holding an office in the inner palace, he 
probably was an eyewitness to the event. According to this contemporary account, 
when the news about the conquest of Yanova reached Istanbul, Mehmed IV moved to 
Edirne, where the Ghazi title was given to him by the Şeyhülislam fatwa and then his 
name was read as “Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han” in the sermon.148 
The date of issuing this fatwa is very crucial. As I have mentioned before, the real 
intent of Abaza Hasan Paşa made itself more apparent when the conquest of Yanova 
was already completed. So, various attempts by the rebels to base their actions on a 
legitimate ground coincided with the conquest. Here, it can be safely argued that 
Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title came up in a very specific political setting and was used as a 
kind of legitimization tool against the rebellion of Abaza Hasan Paşa, on the grounds 
that he interrupted the holy war of Mehmed IV against the infidels in the European 
front. Indeed, if we look at the continuation of this event in Mehmed Halife’s account, 
it can be seen that after the return of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to Edirne, another imperial 
council was gathered with the participation of various state officials. There, Mehmed 
IV gave a speech towards the soldiers, saying that “My servants, are you with me in 
fighting against Celali Hasan Paşa, who interrupted my holy war and helped the infidels 
in this blessed year?”149 
However, the account of Naima is different from Mehmed Halife’s with regard to 
the speech. “Mehmed IV’s holy war” in Tarih-i Gilmani turned in to the “holy war”, 
which did not belong to Mehmed IV’s personality in the retrospective work of Naima 
Tarihi.
150
 The difference in their narration brings to mind that the Ottomans’ attempt to 
make their claim on legitimate grounds by giving reference to Mehmed IV’s 
personality was not taken for granted. It is clear that by using the ghazi image of the 
sultan, the Ottoman ruling elites found a chance to substantiate and better manifest the 
legitimacy of the dynastic claim. In this sense, since Gilmani’s work was a 
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contemporary account, it can be argued that his narration better reflected the concerns 
of the ruling elites in a time when they tried to guarantee the dynastic claim through a 
strong sultanic appearance. Probably, the absence of a reference to Mehmed IV’s Ghazi 
image in Naima's account can be explained with reference to his priorities at the time. 
That is to say, Naima might have not felt a need to add the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV 
into his work due to the fact that the ghazi image of Mehmed IV was not an important 
issue to be mentioned in his time.  
Lastly, it is necessary to mention Baer’s comment on the issue because although 
he always highlighted the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV in every section of his book, he 
did not pay attention to the broader circumstances under which the ghazi title was given 
to Mehmed IV. Throughout his book, one of the mainstays of Baer is to bring the Ghazi 
image of Mehmed IV into the forefront. For this purpose, he tried to reveal the 
rhetorical representations of Mehmed IV at the time, examining nearly all the relevant 
narrative accounts written during the second half of the seventeenth century. However, 
while he was always putting emphasis on Mehmed IV’s depiction by referring to the 
various laudatory sentences in the works of court histories, he significantly eluded the 
historical context and ignored the political realities of the period in question. For 
example, by giving a reference to Mehmed Halife’s work, Tarihi-i Gilmani, Baer 
interpreted the scene, which recounts how the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV, as 
follows:  
“Mehmed IV and his handlers, Hatice Turhan and Abdi Pasha, were 
not unaware of the potential of ghaza for improving the sultan’s image at 
home. Mehmed Halife notes that already in 1658, after the conquest of 
Yanova and following a week of celebrations in the capital, ‘as the felicitous 
sultan arrived in Edirne from Islambol with the intention of waging a 
military campaign, which caused the army to become confident [in his 
warlike intentions], a noble fatwa was issued declaring Mehmed IV a ghazi, 
and thereafter it was decreed that at the Friday sermon his name was to be 
read as ‘Ghazi Sultan Mehmed Khan.’”151  
 
That’s all about Baer’s comment on the issue. However, as I have indicated 
before, the above-quoted passage does not tell Mehmed Halife’s story in depth 
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concerning this event. After all, taking into account the political situation that the 
Ottomans had faced while Mehmed IV was depicted as Ghazi, it can be easily 
suggested that Baer’s argument lack a solid ground, at least about the origin of Mehmed 
IV’s Ghazi title. In this regard, at least, he would have asked following simple but 
crucial question: Under what political context did Mehmed IV get the Ghazi title 
despite the fact he had not personally lead the army in the battlefield?  
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CHAPTER: 3  
THE DISUNITY IN THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT IN THE 
1660s 
 
By taking into consideration the political situation around 1660s in the Ottoman 
Empire, I will try find a plausible answer to the following question: why did Mehmed 
IV decide to join the Kamaniçe campaign to become a Ghazi sultan despite the fact that 
he had already received this title nearly fourteen years ago? At first glance, if one looks 
at the contemporary accounts, it can be seen that the ostensible impetus of Mehmed IV 
for leading the army in the battlefield was his eagerness and the guidance of Vani 
Mehmed Efendi.
152
 Keeping this point in mind yet, I plan to focus on two interrelated 
issues to elaborate this question from a different perspective. Firstly, I dwell on one of 
the most important developments within the Ottoman political system during the 
second half of the seventeenth century that is the division of the state bureaucracy into 
three parts (grand vizier, İstanbul Kaymakamı and Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı), due 
to the mobility of the court. While the grand vizier was on the siege of Candia and 
Mehmed IV was in the hunting expeditions, this situation became more apparent. Here, 
I argue that the personal attendance of Mehmed IV to the campaign of Kamaniçe can be 
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seen as an attempt to unite the decision making process in a more limited ground. The 
second issue that I plan to further pursue in this chapter is Mehmed IV’s indecisive 
attitude when the Venetian ambassador came to his seat for continuing the peace 
negotiation, which can be easily seen in the correspondences made between him and 
the grand vizier. The difficulties encountered especially during the peace negotiation 
between the Ottomans and the Venetians, arising from the multiple administrative 
centers, should have convinced the Ottoman state officials to take an action against this 
disunity within the Ottoman court by setting out the sultan to the campaign. But, before 
moving on these main topics, a brief historical background is needed. 
 
III.1. Historical background  
 
“…the Pashas were for a while all silent, not knowing what  
reply to make, or how to resolve to difficult and knotty a point, until 
Köprülü (who was then the most ancient and perhaps the wisest Pasha, 
as the actions of his following life have sufficiently testified) first 
replyed that in his opinion, the only and most probable means for a 
tottering vizier to secure himself, is to divert the minds of the Grand 
Signior and other working, upon some Foreign War; for Peace is that 
which corrupts the disposition of men, and sets them on work to raise 
themselves with intestine and civil evils; when War buses their spirits, 
and employes them to gain renown and glory by Martial actions, by 
which means Plots and Theachery are droven from our homes; […] 
And it is possible that Ahmet the Son of Köprülü, who began to last 
war with Germany, might go upon this Maxim of his Fathers; for in all 
matters of his Government, he is observed to walk by the fame rules 
and directions, which was bequeathed to him as well as his 
inheritance.”153 
These sentences from the book of Paul Rycaut, who was the private secretary of 
English ambassador during the 1660s and then became British consul at Smyrna, are 
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supposed to have shown Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s advice to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 
regarding the policy that he should follow throughout his tenure as grand vizier. 
Accordingly, there seems to be apparent similarity between the policy of Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa and his son, because Fazıl Ahmed Paşa always tried to keep the army out 
of Istanbul throughout his grand vizierate by launching various military campaigns, 
especially towards the European rivals. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa came to power in 
1661, the war with Venice over Crete was still continuing, even if the previous constant 
confrontations came to an end. Besides, although the larger part of Crete had been 
taken by the Ottomans, some strategic cities and citadels were still in the hands of the 
Venetians.  
As I have mentioned in the second chapter, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa had already 
attempted to launch a land campaign against the Venetians from the Dalmatian coast in 
order to oblige them to surrender Crete to the Ottomans. However, the revolt of 
Rakoczy in the Transylvania region led to the postponement of this campaign. One of 
the main outcomes of this campaign for the Ottomans was to gain a strategic location in 
Transylvania in order to secure the Ottoman rule at that region. In a way, the conquest 
of Yanova castles in 1658 by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa served to this purpose as well.154 
The suppression of this rebellion in favor of the Ottomans, on the other hand, brought 
certain political stability to this region for a while. This political stability gave Köprülü 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa an opportunity for putting an end to the problem with Venice, arising 
from the struggle for establishing full control over Crete. Considering the superiority of 
the Venetians over the naval battle, Ottomans decided to march to Venice through the 
Bosnia region in order to conquer some of the Venetians castles, such as Kotor, Şebnek 
and İspilet.155 However, the direct intervention of the Habsburgs in Transylvania 
necessitated Ottomans to interfere to the region again.  
In order to get involved in this problem, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa launched a military 
campaign against the Habsburg forces commanded by Raimondo Montecuccoli in 
1663, which successfully ended with the conquest of some castles, including Uyvar. In 
the following year, on the other hand, although the Ottoman forces were defeated in the 
                                                          
154
 Metin Kunt, “17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine bir yorum,” in Boğazi i 
Üniversitesi Dergisi, Beşeri Bilimler – Humanities, Vols. 4-5 (1976-1977): 114.  
155
 Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 99-100. 
52 
 
battle of Saint Gotthard by the Habsburgs, the treaty of Vasvar, whose conditions can 
be accepted as in favor of the Ottomans, was signed.
156
 After assuring a peace treaty, 
which is signed for the duration of twenty years, Ottomans took the opportunity to deal 
with the Venetians over Crete. Here, it can easily be suggested that the origin of the 
Ottoman war with the Venetians over Candia between the years 1667-1669 bears upon 
the unfinished war process which had been continuing for nearly twenty two years. 
However, considering the fact that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa always tried to keep the 
negotiation channels open during this siege, which can be easily seen in the diplomatic 
correspondences made between Ottomans and Venetians, it becomes clear that Candia 
remained an important problem in front of the Ottomans which should be peacefully 
solved as far as possible, before the full mobilization of the military forces were 
directed against the western fronts. Indeed, if we look at his long tenure (1661-1676), 
except for the siege of Candia, all the military campaigns were conducted towards the 
Transylvania and Podolia regions.  
So, the reason behind the Kamaniçe campaign should be evaluated as a part of 
Ottoman interest towards the Eastern Europe region in the second half of the 
seventeenth century. As indicated in the previous chapter, the revolt of Bohdan 
Xmel’nyc’kyj in 1648 revealed the fact that the Commonwealth was incapable of 
suppressing a possible Cossack revolt in the future. This situation provoked the 
Ottomans to change their policy towards this region at the expense of the 
Commonwealth, which had previously depended on maintaining a balanced policy 
between the Muscovy and the Commonwealth. In this sense, without any necessity of 
taking the support of the Commonwealth, the Ottomans were in need of regional base 
in the Podolia region to bring the Cossacks under the control of Ottomans. The fortress 
of Kamaniçe provides an appropriate place for the Ottomans to conduct this new policy 
in the Eastern Europe against the Cossacks’ potential attacks in the future.157 While the 
historical developments during the second half of the seventeenth century necessitated 
changing policy of the Ottomans, waging a war still needs a reasonable pretext. 
Kolodziejczyk narrates the trigger reason of the campaign of Kamaniçe as follows: 
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“On 6 September 1669 the Venetians signed articles of capitulation at 
Candia, marking the successful conclusion of the 25-year-long Ottoman 
campaign to conquer the island of Crete. Three months earlier, the 
Ukrainian hetman Petro Dorosenko was accepted as a vassal by the Ottoman 
Porte and granted a diploma, horsetail, tambour, and banner-symbols of 
imperial investiture. In 1670 the Commonwealth broke relations with 
Dorosenko, and in 1671 the grand hetman Jan Sobieski invaded Cossack 
Ukraine. In October 1671 the sultan warned the Polish king against 
attacking the Cossacks, and the governor of Ozii ( Ukr. Ocakiv) Halil Pasha 
was sent to aid Dorosenko. Preparations for war began. In his last letter to 
the Crown deputy chancellor, Jedrzej Olszowski, Ahmed Koprülü reiterated 
the reasons for the war. "You claim Ukraine as your hereditary property. In 
fact, the real owner of all things is only [God] the Highest Lord of the two 
Worlds," wrote the grand vizier. Then the argumentation followed that the 
Cossacks, as a free people, had once accepted the king's patronage under the 
condition that he respect their rights. The king had broken the agreement 
and for the past twenty years he was no longer the legal ruler of Ukraine. 
Every nation may ask for the padishah's protection, as did the Cossacks, and 
the padishah does not reject such request.”158 
 
 
As demonstrated above, the political motive behind the Ottoman campaign 
conducted towards the Podolia region in 1672 originates from the fact that the balance 
of power began to change during the second half of the seventeenth century in favor of 
the Ukranian Cossacks, which compelled the Ottomans to acquire a regional base in the 
Eastern Europe. However, this political situation does not provide a solid ground to 
detect why Mehmed IV personally attended this campaign. To better inquire Mehmed 
IV’s attendance to the campaign of Kamaniçe in 1672, the structure of the Ottoman 
administrative system during the 1660s should be examined. 
 
III.2. The role of Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı (Deputy of the Imperial Stirrup) 
 
To better understand the political development in the Ottoman court system 
during the second half of the seventeenth century, a brief examination of the 
Kaymakam’s involvement in state affairs is in order. Especially, the physical absence 
of the sultans from the military campaigns in the second half of the sixteenth century 
increased the importance of the office of the kaymakamlık, because these officials 
practiced nearly all the authority of the grand vizier in Istanbul, issuing imperial 
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decrees and appointing the state officials, when the grand vizier was launching a 
military campaign in the front.
159
 The tension between the grand vizier as an army 
commander in the battlefield and his deputy in Istanbul or vice versa, culminated at the 
turn of the sixteenth century. In that regard, it would be useful to remember Sinan 
Paşa’s offer to Mehmed III regarding the importance of personal participation of the 
sultan to the campaign.
160
 Karateke summarizes this suggestion as follows: 
 
“If the grand vezir was sent as commander, his deputy (kaimmakam) 
in Istanbul would purposely withhold further soldiers and provisions from 
the army in order to cause the grand vezir to be unsuccessful, in the hope of 
damaging his reputation and ultimately replacing him. If another vezir was 
appointed commander, the grand vezir himself would not want him to 
succeed and thereby become a possible contender for his own position. A 
higher authority such as the sultan himself would be a solution to all these 
problems…”161 
 
Taking into consideration Sinan Paşa’s suggestion, it can be assumed that the 
competition between these two posts would have come to the surface in every military 
campaign, arising either from the factional politics in the court or a hostility between 
these two state officials. However, if one of the lieutenants of the grand vizier became 
kaymakam and stayed in the court to act on behalf of him, there would be no reason for 
the grand vizier to worry about that in the case of his unsuccessful military campaign, 
his deputy would have replaced him. In a similar vein, it can be said that during the 
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grand vizierate of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, he did not encounter such challenge from his 
deputy, because he appointed Kara Mustafa Paşa, brother-in-law, as kaymakam to 
conduct the state affairs during his first two campaigns, meaning the Ottoman-
Habsburg war (1663-1664) and the siege of Candia (1667-1669).
162
  
 
On the other hand, if one looks at the Ottoman court system during the second 
half of the seventeenth century from a broader historical perspective, it can be observed 
that the Ottoman administrative system witnessed a crucial change; that is, the division 
of the state bureaucracy into three parts due to the mobility of the court. To put it more 
precisely, in addition to the kaymakam and the grand vizier, a third office, known as 
rikab-ı hümayun kaymakamı (Deputy of the Imperial Stirrup), which can be defined as 
the “second deputy to the grand vizier charged with accompanying the sultan on his 
excursions outside the capital for the purpose of hunting or during changes of imperial 
residence”,163 made itself more apparent within the realm of Ottoman politics. Rhoads 
Murphey summarizes this development as follows:  
 
“…the court and state bureaucracy was by necessity often divided into 
three parts, each assigned a particular function. This division of function 
applied with particular force during years when military campaigning led by 
the grand vizier was in prospect. One part accompanied the grand vizier 
leading the army in the field, a second part remained behind in Istanbul, 
where the grand vizier’s first deputy, known as the Istanbul kaimmekamı, 
took communications with the front. […] But when the sultan undertook 
excursions for the hunt or for regular seasonal relocations, the royal 
household was further split, and it became necessary for a third official, 
called the rikab-i hümayun kaim-mekamı (deputy of the royal stirrup), to be 
appointed to liaise with both the grand vizier and his chief deputy, the 
principal kaim-mekam, who remained in Istanbul unless expressly 
summoned.”164 
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Although the above-quoted excerpt reveals this change to a certain extent, there is 
one crucial detail that should be revised. From the work of İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 
 smanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye  eşkilatı, we can get brief information about the 
role and status of the kaymakam in the Ottoman administrative system. In the relevant 
chapter of this book, he asserts that the Ottomans used both the terms of Kaymakam-ı 
Rikab-ı Hümayun and Kaymakam-ı Asitane-i Saadet interchangeably. To put it 
differently, although there had been variations in the names of the grand vizier’s deputy 
in Istanbul, these two titles refer to the same person.
165
 He also states that when sultans 
travelled from Istanbul to Edirne, another official was left in Istanbul to conduct the 
state affairs on behalf of the kaymakam.
166
 However, for him, this detail seems to be a 
temporal circumstance within the Ottoman administrative system due to the fact that 
throughout the centuries the Ottoman sultans preferred to stay in Istanbul apart from 
exceptional circumstances. This division, on the other hand, evolved into another 
pattern during the second half of the seventeenth century in which disunity began to 
appear within the Ottoman politics, especially when the grand vizier was leading the 
army in the battlefield. In this regard, it can be said that the mobility of the court arising 
from Mehmed IV’s hunting parties, which were arranged at least fifty times around 
Edirne or in the Balkans between the years 1650-1681,
167
 necessitated the further 
division in the state apparatus.  
 
After the spectacular procession of Mehmed IV to Edirne in 1656,
168
 he 
continued to visit Istanbul occasionally. Until the year that the Ottomans conducted a 
military campaign against the Habsburgs in 1663, he came to Istanbul at least three 
times and although he did not personally follow the army and went as far as Edirne, this 
departure became his fourth voyage to Edirne.
169
 This time span is important because 
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after that time onwards, his previous voyages to Istanbul seems to have decreased; 
instead he began to organize hunting expeditions around Edirne and beyond more 
excessively. Another significant event of this year is that Mehmed IV appointed Abdi 
Paşa as court historian to write the events surrounding the sultan. From this account, we 
have a chance to reach a firsthand knowledge about Mehmed IV’s hunting parties, even 
though he did not describe these expeditions in detail. In this sense, if we follow a 
number of Mehmed IV’s hunting parties during the 1660s, we can see how this division 
took place in the administrative apparatus.  
 
However, firstly, attention should be paid to Murphey’s interpretation about the 
role of the grand vizier’s deputies. As he indicates, state bureaucracy was divided into 
three parts during the reign of Mehmed IV, as of grand vizier, Istanbul kaymakamı and 
rikab-ı hümayun kaymakamı. However, this process did not take shape as Murphey 
indicated in the paragraph above. Contrary to his claim, I suggest that the first deputy of 
the grand vizier, when he was in the military campaign, was not the Istanbul 
kaymakamı, but rather the deputy who accompanied the sultan either in Edirne or in the 
hunting expeditions.  
 
During the 1660s, Kara Mustafa Paşa was the person who held the office of the 
grand vizierate’s chief deputy within the Ottoman administrative system. Indeed, the 
incumbency of Vizier Mustafa Paşa as kaymakam during the first two campaigns of 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa; Ottomans-Habsburgs war (1663-64)170 and the siege of Candia 
(1667-69)
171
 shows that his position occupied a more significant place in the Ottoman 
court during the 1660s than the Istanbul kaymakamı. In this regard, if we look at the 
Abdi Paşa’s account, it can be clearly seen that in most cases without using the specific 
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title, he preferred to use “kaymakam paşa” or “kaymakam Mustafa Paşa172, from which 
it is understood that he actually referred to Mustafa Paşa. Istanbul kaymakamı, on the 
other hand, occupied a less remarkable place in that account. In this narrative source, 
we can only reach the name of the appointed kaymakam to Istanbul, without going into 
detail concerning the task that those officials had taken.
173
 However, this situation only 
shows the condition of the Ottoman administrative apparatus when Mehmed IV was in 
Edirne. That is to say, when he was organizing hunting parties around Edirne, the duty 
of the officials changed to a degree.  
 
For example; in 26 October 1664, Mehmed IV departed from Edirne for hunting 
expeditions which were arranged around Yanbolı region.174 In accordance with his 
duty, Kaymakam normally was expected to stay in Edirne to conduct the state affairs on 
behalf of the grand vizier. In that case, however, Mehmed IV also summoned the 
kaymakam to join his hunting parties which lasted twenty five days.
175
 In the meantime, 
Vizier Yusuf Paşa was left in Edirne as the deputy of kaymakam Mustafa Paşa in order 
not to delay the functioning the state affairs.
176
 Likewise, in the following year, 
Mehmed IV decided to make another hunting expedition around Dimetoka and Ferecik, 
in which Mustafa Paşa was again called to join this trip and Yusuf Paşa was 
commissioned in Edirne as the official of the Ottoman government.
177
 We can also see 
the same practice during the siege of Candia. In 1666, after the departure of Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa from Edirne for the preparations of the campaign, Mehmed IV arranged 
another hunting expedition around Yanbolu region. Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa was 
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invited to join this voyage and he left Vizier Mahmud Paşa behind in order to conduct 
the state affairs instead of him in Edirne.
178
  
 
More important than these, even Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa attended these hunting 
parties; sometimes he could not have a chance to reach Mehmed IV directly. To put it 
more clearly, although he accompanied Mehmed IV during these expeditions, he still 
continued to communicate with the sultan by using the Telhis.
179
 This brings to mind 
that he departed from Edirne together with the sultan but moved on till the specific 
place, where he conducted the state affairs with the other officials. Abdi Paşa’s account 
provides an opportunity to observe this detail. In 28 November 1667, Kaymakam 
Mustafa Paşa left Edirne with his retinues to join another hunting party of the sultan, 
during which Mehmed IV visited Kaymakam Paşa’s menzil (billet).180 It seems that 
Mehmed’s constant mobility day by day during these expeditions required further 
division in the state bureaucracy, therein kaymakam and sultan communicated in 
writing in some cases. Despite the fact that nearly all of the important decisions, such as 
negotiations with the other states’ ambassadors, appointments of the state officials or 
conducting of the state affairs, were performed by the kaymakam himself, the mobility 
of the court seems to have created both communication and administration problems, 
which became more apparent while the siege was continuing in Crete. 
 
Consequently, it can be clearly inferred from these examples that when the sultan 
was in Edirne, the grand vizier’s chief deputy was not Istanbul Kaymakamı as Murphey 
asserts. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s close relative and future’s grand vizier, Vizier Mustafa 
Paşa became the most important state official in the absence of the grand vizier during 
the 1660s. In that manner, it can also be argued that Mustafa Paşa’s personality, 
meaning that the necessity of leaving a reliable official near the sultan, rather than his 
office became significant for the Ottoman ruling elites. Indeed, after the return of Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa from the siege of Candia, he personally attended Mehmed IV’s hunting 
party. As a deputy of the grand vizier, on the other hand, Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa was 
                                                          
178
 Abdi Paşa, Vekayiname, 249.  
179
 Abdi Paşa, Vekayiname, 167-168.   
180
 Abdi Paşa, Vekayiname, 275-276.  
60 
 
left in Edirne on behalf of acting Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.181 Consequently, it seems that the 
Ottoman officials tried to find a pragmatic solution to the deputy problem when 
Mehmed IV was in the hunting parties around Edirne. In this sense, the division of the 
Ottoman state bureaucracy into many parts during the second half of the seventeenth 
century can be regarded as the consequence of the mobility of the court. Yet, a further 
research should be undertaken for understanding this disunity in a more comprehensive 
manner. Especially, the indecisive behaviors of Mehmed IV, when the Venetian 
ambassador came to his seat during the siege of Candia, explicitly reveal the disunity in 
the decision making process in the Ottoman administrative system, which can be 
observed in the correspondences made between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Mehmed IV. 
 
III.3. Correspondences between Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during the 
siege of Candia 
 
 
In relation with the siege of Candia, the most important work is the account of 
Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, who was the seal keeper of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during this siege. 
Although his work, known as The Jewels of History (Cevâhirü’t-Tevârîh), can be 
categorized under the gazavatname genre, Hasan Ağa incorporated some other 
diplomatic documents, including imperial writs and correspondences made between 
various state officials, which distinguished it from other works to a considerable extent. 
The author of this narrative account has been debatable in the Ottoman historiography. 
While Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, Franz Babinger and Agah Sırrı Levend suggests that the 
author of this work was Erzurumlu Osman Dede, there is a consensus in the more 
recent studies that Hasan Ağa was the actual writer of this work.182 This confusion has 
been originated from the fact that there was another account written later on by 
Erzurumlu Osman Dede, known as Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Probably, their similar 
contents apart from the small variations led these historians to assume that this work 
was written by him. In addition to Osman Dede’s account, both Mehmed Raşid Efendi 
and Fındıklılı Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, who formed their works in the first quarter of the 
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seventeenth century, benefited from Hasan Ağa’s account to a considerable extent 
while narrating the last stage of the Cretan War. For that reason, in the following parts 
of this chapter, I mostly consult on the account of Hasan Ağa.  
During the siege of Candia, Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had exchanged 
several telhis and imperial writs, all of which were recorded down to the last detail in 
the account of Hasan Ağa. Before going into detail of these correspondences, it would 
be better to mention Baer’s comments on these letters. According to him, Mehmed IV 
was very interested in the condition of the army in the battlefield and closely followed 
the events occurred over the course of the siege of Candia. He also suggests that in 
these letters Mehmed IV “constantly humbled himself in prayer for God’s assistance, 
confident that because his men followed the model of Muhammad they would be 
victorious in their efforts for Islam, the House of Osman, and God, and that the enemies 
of Islam and the Ottoman dynasty would be utterly frustrated.”183 In this regard, if one 
disregards the rhetorical features of the discourse used in these letters, which can be 
regarded as the typical communication process made between the sultan and the army 
commander aiming to give moral motivation to the combatants in the battlefield, one 
can erroneously assume that Mehmed IV was closely involved in the state affairs. Put 
differently, nearly all of the letters or imperial writs sent by Mehmed IV to Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa do not signify the sultan’s personal dedication to the state affairs as Baer 
argues. In this regard, his imperial writs during the siege of Candia do not go far 
beyond the rhetorical religious passages which aimed to exhort the army in the 
battlefield by way of praising the grand vizier. Beyond the rhetorical aspects, these 
letters should also be examined from the perspective of the political context because 
only this way Mehmed IV’s personal interest towards the state affairs can be 
understood. 
 
Beginning with the releasing of the Venetian ambassador who had been under 
arrest for nearly twelve years, all the diplomatic negotiations between the Ottomans and 
the Venetians had been conducted by the grand vizier himself.
184
 Even upon the deaths 
of the Venetian ambassadors while the peace negotiations continued, new officials were 
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directly sent to the grand vizier’s office.185 For that reason, it is difficult to see any hint 
in the correspondences made between the sultan and the grand vizier that Mehmed IV 
was engaged with the diplomatic issues. However, after Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s demand 
for the appointment of a new official for conducting the diplomatic negotiations on 
behalf of the Venetians from the Doge of Venice,
186
 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s authority over 
the diplomatic negotiations got out of his hand for a while, because this time, Venetians 
directly sent the envoy to the sultan. Although there is no direct reference in the 
account of Hasan Ağa for the question why did the Venetians decide to send their 
envoy to the sultan instead of the grand vizier’s office as they did previously, it can be 
assumed that in the light of the previous futile attempts from the grand vizier’s part, the 
Venetians might have decided to continue the negotiation process from another ground.  
 
This point is important for our inquiry because Mehmed IV’s indecisive attitude 
towards the siege of Candia during this negotiation puts the course of the siege at risk 
in the succeeding days. In order to better understand the level of concern that Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa felt after he had received the imperial writ sent by Mehmed IV, the 
correspondences made between the grand vizier and the sultan during this period and 
the consecutive developments will be demonstrated in detail in the following lines.   
 
In 7 of November 1668, Mehmed IV sent an imperial writ to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 
in which he informed his grand vizier that the Venetian ambassador came close to his 
seat. It can be clearly inferred from this letter that Mehmed IV began to be worried 
about the prolongation of the siege of Candia. In that letter he anxiously asked Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa how they should treat the Venetian ambassador when he would come to 
his seat. The following quotation from Mehmed IV’s imperial writ reveals his anxiety: 
 
“The Venetians ambassador reached to the vicinity of the Yenişehir 
but he did not come to my office yet. My tutor, what do you say, when the 
ambassador arrives, what response do we give him? If you come to believe 
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that we will conquer the castle, I will want it from the ambassador. But if 
the siege will continue one year more, my empire will be incapable of 
sending soldiers, supplying munitions and other military requirements.”187 
 
We can understand from the account of Hasan Ağa that Mehmed IV’s uncertainty 
was taken very seriously by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. After receiving this letter, he gave a 
response that if the Venetian ambassador came to the court giving Candia to the 
Ottomans, negotiations could be made with him. But, if he came with the offers already 
suggested by the previous ambassadors to the grand vizier, he should be sent away. In 
that letter, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa also states that the reason behind the delay of the conquest 
of the city lies in the fact that the Ottoman soldiers were tired of fighting for a long 
time. However, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was very confident that they were going to conquer 
Candia in a short time. For that reason, the possible tribute offers presented by the 
ambassador should not be taken into account. More important than his official Telhis, he 
also wrote private letters to high ranked state officials, including Kaymakam Mustafa 
Paşa, Şeyhülislam Minkarizade Yahya Efendi, Silahdar Kız Hüseyin Ağa, Musahib 
vizier Mustafa Paşa and Vani Mehmed Efendi, expecting they could help influence the 
sultan’s opinion regarding the continuation of the siege.188 The subsequent events, 
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sâ’at Ĥaķķ Te’âlâdan fetĥin isterüz. İmdi aķçesine yâhud münâfıķlaruñ sözlerine i’timâd 
buyurmayub ber-ân yaķın ķuluñ gönderdük ki Ķandiye Ķal’ası ne ĥalde ķalmışdur görsün. Elçiye 
hemân merd-âne cevâb buyurılsun. Ve işbu şehr-i meźkûruñ beşinci güni telhîś ve mekâtib ile 
Ķaplan Aġayollanmışdur.” 
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occurred after this correspondence between the sultan and the grand vizier, are more 
crucial for our inquiry, but before moving on this issue, it would be better to glance at 
the interpretation of Marc David Baer about this situation: 
 
“The letters exchanged between the sultan and his grand vizier often 
referred, explicitly or implicitly, to connections among manliness, victory in 
battle, and propagation of the faith. This metaphor of sexual impotence is 
tied directly to the empire’s honor and by extension to that of the sultan. 
Comprehending the import of the writ, the grand vizier wept for three days 
and nights and became greatly distressed. It took him days to write a 
response. He wrote letters to all key men of state, including the 
sheikhulislam and Vani Mehmed Efendi, hoping they could help assuage the 
sultanic anger. Finally he informed the sultan that the army was fatigued but 
that the citadel would soon be theirs. He asked God to be on their side, to 
not let the citadel remain in infidel hands. Using the language of manliness, 
he wrote that it was necessary to give the ambassador a manly response.” 189   
 
The problem in this interpretation is Baer’s incomprehensive approach that fails to 
handle the possible outcome of Mehmed IV’s standpoint in this letter over the state 
policy regarding the future of the siege of Candia. The distressed situation of the grand 
vizier after he took this imperial writ, on the other hand, did not originate from the fact 
that he was under the pressure of fulfilling the Islamic zeal on behalf of the sultan as 
Baer argues, but that his previous diplomatic negotiations, which had been carefully 
conducted for nearly two years, would have come to naught. More important than this 
maybe, the withdrawal from this siege after spending so much military efforts without 
gaining any success would have resulted a disastrous and costly attempt for the 
Ottomans. 
 
After receiving the letter of grand vizier, Mehmed IV, replied to Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa with an imperial writ. By informing the delegate’s offer that Venice accepted to 
pay an annual tribute, on condition that the Ottomans retreat from the siege of Candia, 
he asked the grand vizier whether he came to believe that the conquest of Candia was 
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imminent.
190
 In return, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa held a council with the participation of high-
ranked military and administrative leaders in the island of Crete to discuss this offer. In 
the end, they agreed upon that it would be an inappropriate decision to relinquish from 
the siege because all the military efforts mobilized nearly for two years would have 
amounted to nothing, emphasizing that no one consented to give up Candia to Venice 
due to all they had suffered during this siege. The consensus among the high-ranked 
military and administrative leaders in the course of the siege was reported to the court in 
another letter written by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.191   
 
Mehmed IV, on the other hand, responded with an encouraging letter, in which he 
gave sanction to the continuation of the siege, stating that retreat from the siege after 
spending great effort would be a shameful attempt for the Islamic zeal. For that reason, 
he was ready to provide all the necessary equipments for the success of the Ottoman 
forces in the battlefield.
192
 Putting aside the rhetorical themes in that letter, it is safe to 
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ve dü’âm biledür. Venedik elçisi gelüb bu ķadar aķçe gösterüb Ķandiye Ķal’ası'ndan vazgecüñ 
deyü rikâbumda ve sâ’ir işde olan kimesnelere aķçe ve pîş-keş ‘arż idüb, nedersin Ķandiye 
Ķal’ası'nuñ fetĥ u teshîrine ‘aķluñ irüşir mi? Fi'l-vâķî’ irüşürse ne güzel ve illâ bize aña göre i’lâm 
idesin.” 
191
 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 352-53. “Śadr-ı a’žam dahî tekrâr telhîś ve âdem 
rikâb-ı hümâyûna işbu şehr-i Recebüñ sekizinci (8 Receb 1079/12 Aralık 1668) güni gönderüb 
mefhûmında, ‘ažametlü pâd-şâhum cümle umûr-bîn ve vüzerâ-i ‘ižâmuñ ve vükelâ-i kirâmuñ ve 
yeñiçeri ve sipâh aġaların ile ve gerek a’lâ ve gerek ednâ ile niçe kerre müşâvere ve mükâleme 
olınub Ķandiye Ķal’a(sı) küffâr-ı bî-dîn elinde ķalmaġa buña bir ferdüñ rıżâsı olmayub bir buçuķ 
senede olan zaĥmetler ve meşaķķatler ve ceng ü ĥarb ve niçe biñ şühedâ ve niçe kere biñ kîse aķçe 
maśrafından mâ-’adâ nâmûs-ı dîn ü devlet ve huśûśâ cümleden elzem. İmdi bu ķış dahî metersde 
cümle ‘asker-i İslâmile ķışlamaķ ķarâr virilmişdür ve ķal’anuñ iki tarafı dahî beşyüz zirâ’ ĥâkile 
berâber olmışdur ve ĥâlâ bir ayaġımuz ķal’anuñ içerisindedür. Hemân gelen elçi’i girü geldügi 
yola göndereler ve ‘asker-i İslâm'a biraz ‘asker imdâd ve bârut ve beldâr ve hažîneye bir gün 
(evvel) irsâl "ve himmet-i" hümâyunları mebźûl olmaķ ümîdindeiz. İnşâ’allâhu Te’âlâ ilk baharda 
lutf-ı Ĥaķķile Ķandiye Ķal’ası'nuñ fetĥ u teshîri görinür.” 
192
 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 356-357. “Siz ki vezîr-i a’žamum ve ser-dâr-ı 
ekremüm Aĥmed Paşa'sın. Sizi selâm-ı selâmet- bahşâ-yı pâd-şâhânem ile teşrîf ve tevķîr u iĥtirâm 
ve mažhar-ı i’zâz ü ikrâm buyurduġumdan śoñra ĥatt-ı hümâyûnum-ı se’âdet-maķrûnum vuśulinde 
ma’lûmıñuz olsun ki, ĥâliyen vüzerâ-i ‘ižâm ve vükelâ-yı kirâmımuñ sen cümleden a’ķal ve erşed 
ve a’del ve emcedi müdebbir-i kâr-dân ve dilîr-i şecâ’at-nişân olduġıñdan ġayri me’mûr oldıġuñ 
hiźemât-ı dil-pezîrüñle intižâm virüb, żabt u rabtlarında ve eger "merd-âne ve dilîr-âne" düşmen-i 
dîne göz açdırmayub muĥâśara olınan Ķandiye Ķal’ası’nuñ teshîrine niçe tedbîr idüb geregi gibi 
muvâfıķ "rıżâ-yı" yümn-i iķtiżâ-yı mülûkânem ve lâ’ik-i ‘ırż u nâmûs-ı saltanat-ı pâdşâhânem 
olmaķ üzre himmetler eyledügüñ ecilden dü’â-i hayr-i icâzet-eŝerüme nâ’il ve ‘inâyet-i ‘aliyye-i 
meymenet-perverüme mažhar olmışsızdur. Yüzüñ aķ ve nân u nemeküm saña ĥalâl olsun ve 
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say that the exhortation letters of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa sent to the high ranked officials in 
the court must have influenced Mehmed IV’s inclination towards the siege of Candia, 
because he was not only persuaded to continue the siege of Candia, but he also 
personally dismissed the Venetian ambassador from his seat to be imprisoned in Hanya 
and then to sent to Venice. However, his decision to send away the delegate of Venice 
was perceived by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa as an unexpected action, surprising and distressing 
him very much because his carefully conducted diplomatic negotiations nearly for two 
years would have been faced with the potential failure. This situation, in return, would 
have confronted Fazıl Ahmed Paşa with the only one option on the issue of Candia - to 
try to finalize this siege by way of military solution. The dismissal of the ambassador 
from the court gave Fazıl Ahmed Paşa trouble regarding the motivation of certain 
members of the soldiers in the front; but before moving on this issue, a further 
examination should be made for the division within the Ottoman court. In the following 
lines, by examining the correspondences made between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and the 
Venetian ambassador, emphasis will be put upon the disunity in the decision making 
process, which became more apparent after the Venetian ambassador was sent to Hanya 
upon the wrath of Mehmed IV. 
 
On 18 January 1669, messenger Ahmed Çelebi reached to Crete with the news 
coming from the court that the ambassador was imprisoned in Hanya to be sent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
senüñle ma’an me’mûr olan vüzerâ-i ‘ižâm ve mîr-i mîrân ve ümerâ-i kirâm ve yeñiçeri aġası ve 
bölük aġaları ve zu’amâ ve erbâb-ı tîmar ve sipâh ve yeñiçeri ve sâ’ir ‘umûm üzre ‘asker-i İslâm 
ķullarımuñ uġur-ı dûn ü devletümde cân u başların ne vechile beźl ü fidâ idüb iki seneden berü 
muĥâśara itdükleri Ķandiye Ķal’ası’nuñ teshîrine itdükleri iķdâm ü ihtimâmları künhile ma’lûm-ı 
husrevânum olub cümlesi dü’â-i hayruma mažhar olmışlardur. Yüzleri aķ ve iki cihânda ber-
hurdâr olsunlar. Hiźmetleri muķâbelesinde ben dahî inşâ’allâhu Te’âlâ ebvâb-ı in’âm u iĥsânumı 
küşâde ve bî-dirîġ idüb maĥallinde herbirinüñ isti’dâd u liyâķatlerine göre "aĥsin kemâ 
aĥsena'llâhu ileyke" muķteżâsınca ‘atiyye-i behiyye-i pâd-şâhânemle ber-murâd ve maķżiyyü'l-
merâm eylemem muķarrerdür. İmdi göreyüm seni, dâmen-i ġayreti meyân-ı himmete bend idüb 
ĥusn-i ittifâķ ve kemâl-i ittihâd u fâsıķ ile himmet eyleyüb teshîr-i3034 ikdâm u ihtimâm 
eyleyesin. Bunca sa’y-i emekden śoñra terk eylemek lâ’ik-i ġayret-i İslâm degildür. Lâzım olan 
mühimmât u âlât ve ‘asâkir bu tarafdan peyder pey yetişdirülmek muķarrerdür. Hemân ġuzât u 
mücâhidîn ķullarıma ġayret virüb a’dâ-yı dîne mikdârın bildürmek gereksiz. Bu ķal’a teshîri 
aķśâyı murâd-ı hümâyûnumdur. Bi-eyyi vechin kân fetĥ-ı teshîrine bel baġlayub bu ġazâ- yı nuśret 
encâma aĥsen-i vech ki fetĥ u žafer ile ahź-i intiķâmdur. İhtimâm virmege beźl ü ķudret ve śarf-ı 
himmet eyleyesiz ve ĥâlâ maĥż-ı ‘atiyye-i celiyye-i husrevânem ve ‘inâyet-i seniyye-i şâhânemdan 
bir ŝevb-i ŝerâ-ser ķaplu semmûr-ı fâ’iżu's-surûr ve bir ŝevb-i sâde serâ-ser ve bir ķabża-i şemşîr-i 
‘adüvv-tedmîr ve bir ķabża dahî muraśśa’ hançer saña iĥsân-ı hümâyûnum olub hâśśa 
muśâĥiblerümden Yûsuf Aġa ķulum ile göndermişümdür. Ve vüzerâ ve mîr-i mîrân ve ümerâ 
vesâ’ir ķullarıma birer ŝevb hil’at gönderilmişdür. Envâ u i’zâz ve ikrâm u ta’žîm-i iĥtirâm ile 
istiķbâl idüb geyüb taĥśîl-i mubâĥât itdükden śoñra ba’de'l-yevm eđ’âf-ı mużâ’af ve diķķat ü 
himmet eyleyesiz göreyüm sizi ve'sselâm.” 
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Venice.
193
 While the Venetian ambassador was still a prisoner in Hanya, he sent a letter 
to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, asking whether he was going to be accepted by him to resume the 
diplomatic negotiations which had been already interrupted in the court.
194
 After 
receiving the letter of ambassador, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa wanted him to clarify what was it 
that he did and resulted in him being dismissed from the seat of the sultan. Similarly, in 
order to learn the reason of the sultan’s wrath, he sincerely asked him to report all the 
diplomatic attempts he conducted while he had been in the court. This letter also gives 
us an indication that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa seems to have been surprised by the 
imprisonment of the ambassador in Hanya because he honestly pointed out in this letter 
that it was a rare instance in the past years that an ambassador had been rejected. 
Although Fazıl Ahmed Paşa accepted his corresponding with Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa, 
he admitted that Kaymakam Paşa did not give details about the events in the court. Most 
probably, it was for this reason that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was obliged to ask the 
ambassador for the details of the negotiations that he had already made in the court, 
wondering what action had had the ambassador dismissed from the seat of the sultan.
195
 
In his response, the ambassador stated that he had done nothing to be exposed to the 
wrath of the sultan. He specified the fact that his accommodation for nearly one month 
and a half in Yenişehir where he received a kind treatment by the sultan, demonstrates 
his innocence.
196
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 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 354-355.  
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 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 357.  
195
 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 357-358. “Mektûbuñ gelüb mefhûmında herne ki 
yazılmış ise ma’lûmlarımuz oldı. Aĥvâlüñi bildürmişsin ve Ĥanya’da ķalurmıyuz yohsa ol tarafa 
mı varıruz deyü suvâl etmişsin. ‘Ažametlü pâd-şâhımuz sizi redd idüb Venedik’e gönderilmek 
içün ġađab ile fermân-ı hümâyûnları śâdır olub bu cânibe gönderilmişler idi. Rikâb-ı 
hümâyûnlarına recâ vü niyâz, ecdâd-ı ‘ıžamları zamânında elçiler redd olına gelmemişdür. ‘Arż 
eyledügimüzde Ĥanya'da ĥabs olınmañuz bâbında fermân-ı ‘âlîleri śâdır olub ‘ızzetli Ķâyim-i 
maķâm Paşa ķarındâşımuza buluşduķda bilmeziz ne söz söyledügüñi ki böyle ġađab (ve) ‘ıķaba 
mažhar olduķ. ‘Izzetlü Ķâyimi maķâm Paşa ķarındâşımuz dahî anda ne yüzden cevâbıñûz olduġın 
bize tafśîl üzre bildürmediler. Eger seni Venedik tarafından muķaddemâ İstefe’de söyleşilen uslûb 
üzre yine ol eski sözler ile göndermişler ise fikirsüzlük etmişler. Şevketlü (ve) ķudretlü pâd-
şâhımuz Allâh Te’âlâ'nuñ iĥsânı olan ķuvvet ü ķudret ile bu sefer-i hümâyûna ĥareket buyurub 
‘asker-i İslâm bu işüñ üzerinde bulınduķdan śoñra muķaddem söyleşilen sözler el virmedügi 
žâhirdür. Ve eger sen kendüñ mâbeyninde bir maślaĥat göreyüm dirseñ bu vaķte muvâfaķat olmaz 
nâ-sezâ sözler ile iş biter, ķıyâs eyledüñ ise yañılmışsın. Bu vaķtüñ  iķtiżâsı ġayri yüzden bir söz 
ile itmâm-ı maślaĥata mübâşeretdür. İmdi haķîķat üzre aĥvâlüñi ve me’zûn oldıġuñ güftâr-ki tafśîl 
üzre bu tarafa yazub bildiresün ki bu cezâya neden müsteĥaķ olduġuñ bizüm dahî ma’lûmımuz 
olub, şevketlü ve ‘ažametlü pâdşâhımuñ rikâb-ı hümâyûnına ve eger Ķâyim-i maķâm Paşa 
ķarındâşımuza aĥvâlüñ aña göre yazılub ‘arż u mükâtebe ola.” 
196
 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 360-361. 
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Here, it should be underlined that the limited historiography on the reign of 
Mehmed IV makes itself apparent once again in the interpretation of these 
correspondences. In this regard, leaving the interpretation of Marc David Baer out 
because of its rhetorical content, the only contemporary study which concentrated on 
the political aspect of these correspondences is the work of Ersin Gülsoy.
197
 In the 
relevant chapter of his book, by giving references to the various narrative accounts, he 
meticulously recounts all the important themes of the negotiations made between Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa and the Venetian ambassador. Taking all these correspondences into 
consideration, Gülsoy reaches to the conclusion that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was well aware 
of the details of the negotiations made in the court. According to him, the underlying 
reason behind the supposed unawareness of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa regarding the 
ambassador’s contact with the sultan lies in his attitude that does not let the ambassador 
know Mehmed IV’s inclination to retreat from the siege of Candia. In the same vein, 
another intention of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during the course of the negotiations with the 
ambassador, for Gülsoy, is to show that he and Mehmed IV shared the same standpoint 
regarding the direction of the siege, emphasizing the sultan’s strong desire for the 
conquest of Candia.
198
 As Gülsoy argues, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa received a number of 
letters, informing him about the offers presented by the ambassador. However, there is 
no direct reference in the first-hand Ottoman sources that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was 
properly informed by the court about the details of the negotiations. So, it can be clearly 
inferred that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s inquiries about the details of the negotiations made in 
the court does not reflect his effort to give the impression that he and the court followed 
the same consistent policy towards Venice, but rather his unawareness about the details 
of the negotiations conducted in the court. It was for that reason that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 
specifically asked the Venetian ambassador to report in detail why he had been 
dismissed from the court to be imprisoned in Hanya.  
On the other hand, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa seems to have faced another important 
problem when the Venetian ambassador came to Crete on 18 January 1669. Although he 
was sent away for imprisonment upon the decree of sultan, Ottoman soldiers supposed 
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 Ersin Gülsoy, Girit in fethi ve  smanlı idaresinin kurulması,   45-1670. (Istanbul: Tarih ve 
Tabiat Vakfı, 2004). 
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 Ersin Gülsoy, Girit’in Fethi, 176-177. 
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that Venice’s official came to Hanya for surrendering Candia to the Ottomans.199 It 
seems that this misunderstanding along with the uncertainty about the future of war and 
inconclusive diplomatic negotiations between these two states affected the motivation of 
a certain number of Ottoman soldiers in the battlefield. Indeed, while the negotiation 
between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and the Venetian ambassador were continuing in the island, 
the discontent among the cavalry forces came out.
200
 In 15 March 1669, two months 
after the Venetian ambassador came to Hanya, nearly five hundred cavalrymen, who 
had voluntarily joined up the army for serving as the guardians after the conquest of this 
city, rebelled against the grand vizier on the ground that they had been not employed in 
fighting in the siege. Although it would be hard to say that this minor resentment in the 
army reflected the sentiment of the majority, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa took this uprising 
seriously and felt the need to inform the soldiers about the content of the negotiation in 
the following days, whose details were already indicated above. After the interruption of 
the negotiation made with the ambassador in Katır iftliği on 28 March 1669, the grand 
vizier particularly wanted the soldiers to know that the Venetian official was sent back 
to Hanya due to the fact that he refused to give up Candia.
201
 It can be clearly inferred 
from this situation that the ambiguity about the course of war arising from the disunity 
in the decision making process forced Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to take action against this 
uncertainty by informing the soldiers about the details of the negotiation. 
 
After all, it can be concluded that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy 
into three parts (grand vizier, İstanbul kaymakamı and Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı) in 
the 1660s, which created complications during the siege of Candia, should have 
convinced some Ottoman state officials that the sultan should personally lead the 
campaigns in the 1660s to take action against the disunity in the state bureaucracy. 
Indeed, Mehmed IV’s indecisive behaviors towards the Venetian ambassador during the 
siege of the Candia between the years of 1667-1669, as his correspondences with 
Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha make evident, puts the course of the siege of Candia at 
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 Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevahirü’t-Tevarih, 354-355. “...elçi-i Venedik Ĥanya’ya geldügi haberi 
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risk. In order not to confront such complications, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, as the army 
commander in the front, should have attempted to unify the state bureaucracy within a 
more limited ground by setting out the sultan to the campaigns in the 1670s. In this 
sense, it can be clearly inferred that the proximity of the sultan to the battlefield, or at 
least to the grand vizierate’s office during the campaigns, conduced to smooth the way 
for centralizing the decision making process. Indeed, Mehmed IV attended all the 
military expeditions after the campaign of Kamaniçe despite the fact that he only 
proceed to certain distances.  
 
Since Mehmed IV received a Ghazi title prior to actually taking part in a 
campaign in the 1650s, his personal attendance to the campaign of Kamaniçe in 1672 
should be evaluated from a broader plane, not merely looking his ghazi identity. For this 
aim, in the following section, I will briefly touch upon to the question that how did the 
campaign of Kamaniçe in 1672 pave the way for the remembrance of the traditions? 
 
III.4. The campaign of Kamaniçe as a means of remembrance of the traditions 
 
 
The campaign of Kamaniçe should be evaluated for the purpose of answering the 
question to what extent did the realization of Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title with this 
campaign contribute to the legitimacy of the dynastic claim. Without putting an effort to 
contextualize this campaign from a broader plane, one cannot understand the way in 
which the Ottoman elites secured the legitimate power of the sultan. In this sense, it can 
be suggested that this imperial campaign, which Mehmed IV personally attended paved 
the way for the remembrance of the forgotten traditions. Beginning with the imperial 
procession held in Edirne when the Ottoman army set out a military campaign against 
the Podolia region in 1672, the Ottoman ruling elites began to constitute a number of 
devices, which can be regarded as the source of legitimacy.
202
 Within this context, 
Mehmed IV’s personal participation in the campaign aims to convey broader messages 
to the public, arranging a spectacular parade in May 1672.   
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 The rest of this part depends mostly on the article of Tülay Artan, see; Tülay Artan, “Royal 
weddings and the Grand Vezirate: Institutional and Symbolic Change in the Early Eighteenth 
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The most detailed account concerning the imperial parade of Mehmed IV and 
other high ranking state officials for the Kamaniçe campaign can be found in the diary 
of Antoine Galland, who was the assistant of Marquis De Nointel, the French 
ambassador in the Ottoman court between the years 1670-79. Interestingly enough, the 
details in this account are also unique among the Ottoman narrative sources through 
which one cannot encounter such a long account of this procession. Galland states that 
he had seen several processions in the Ottoman state, such as Friday ceremonies, 
religious festivals, and reception of ambassadors, but this parade was the most grandiose 
compared to previous ones.
203
 As a foreign observe, he narrates nearly all the interesting 
details from his perspective.  
 
He gives a long description of the parade, arraying all the main parts of it. 
According to him, there were seven main parts, in which the lord chancellor, the 
minister of finance, Ibrahim Paşa, Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa, Musahip Mustafa Paşa, the 
grand vizier and the sultan respectively passed through, showing their spectacular attires 
to the people.
204
 The interesting thing here is that the last person who passed through 
this parade was the sultan himself. On the other hand, in one of the most important law 
codes written in the second half of the seventeenth century, that is the  evki’i 
Abdurrahman Paşa Kanun-namesi (1676)205, the order is as follows: sultan, grand 
vizier, şeyhülislam, lord chancellor and minister of finance, chief justices, janissary 
commanders and other officials who were in the lower position.
206
 This change in the 
order of the persons who participated in the major processions is crucial for 
enlightening the forgotten state protocol through the decades. Indeed, it is written in the 
beginning of the  evki’i’s law code that the reason of the compilation of this work 
originates from the need for recording the state protocol before they are forgotten.
207
 
Since the sultans had not personally participated in the military campaigns for a long 
time, the order of the procession in the campaign of Kamaniçe seems to have been not 
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organized according to the certain laws. That is to say, since the personal participation 
of the sultans to the campaigns did not ever materialize since the 1630s, it can be safely 
assumed that the state protocol during the imperial procession held in 1672 was not 
arranged according to Kanun-ı Kadim. 
 
Another interesting point during this procession can be seen in the selection of the 
attires. Abdi Paşa in his account indicates the new turbans, which should be worn by the 
viziers. He recounts that the viziers shall be attired in a Kallavi turban instead of Selimi, 
stating that wearing a Kallavi turban had been the necessity of the ancient law (Kanun-ı 
Kadim), but it was forgotten a long time ago.
208
 The same protocol regulation was also 
registered in the book Tevki’i Abdurrahman Paşa.209 Such redefinition of the state 
protocol found more space in Hezarfen Huseyin Efendi’s  elhisu’l-Beyan fi Kavanin-i 
Al-i Osman written in 1686.
210
 
 
In her article, in which one section devoted to the Ottoman state protocol after the 
mid-seventeenth century, Tülay Artan enlightens other elements which were used by the 
Ottomans as a means to convey legitimacy through various mechanisms.
211
 For 
example; the circumcision of Mehmed IV’s two sons in the imperial festival organized 
in 1675,
212
 Silsilename commissioned in 1682 before the siege of Vienna
213
 and the 
books of protocol already mentioned above “were basic sources or emblems of 
legitimacy...” 214 All of these practices implemented especially after the campaign of 
Kamaniçe reminds us that Ottomans felt the need to enhance the legitimacy of the 
dynastic claim by actualizing certain devices, which enabled them to enhance the 
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sultanic authority and his image. Within this context, the Kammaniçe campaign was 
perceived by the ruling elites as an opportunity to convey the messages to the public 
regarding the dynastic legitimacy of the House of Osman by regarding restoring the 
sultan to his previous position as the military leader. Ottomans had no choice but to give 
the Ghazi title to Mehmed IV in the face of Abaza Hasan Paşa’s political claims in 1658 
because the Yanova castle had already been conquered by the grand vizier Köprülü 
Mehmed Paşa when the mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa came out. Although Mehmed IV 
did not participate to this campaign in person, the successful military campaign led by 
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa enabled the ruling elite to call upon the Ghazi image of Mehmed 
IV, as the earlier Ottoman sultans did previously. However, since the Ghazi title of 
Mehmed IV materialized in concrete manner with the campaign of Kamaniçe, the ruling 
elites have had more alternative apparatus to implement various legitimating tools for 
the purpose of displaying a stronger sultanic public appearance by ordering ceremonies, 
rituals and regulations.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
 
In his article Janissaries and other riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a 
cause,
215
 Cemal Kafadar provides a list of janissary uprisings in Istanbul from 1622 
until its demolition in 1826. Remarkably enough, according to his list, although the 
preceding eight years saw four major revolts, there is no a major janissary revolt 
between the years 1656 and 1687, which coincides with successive incumbency of 
three members of the Köprülü family, namely, Mehmed Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, and 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa. How can we explain the absence of major janissary 
revolts in Istanbul? To what extent this phenomenon can be linked to the autocratic rule 
and general policy of the Köprülü family, or is there a direct link between the 
successive campaigns that Ottomans undertook and the absence of military revolt in 
Istanbul? In this connection, Ottoman historiography has a deep silence regarding what 
was taking place in the capital during the long sojourn of the Ottoman court. Related to 
this, for instance, Rıfat Ali Abou-El-Haj’s account of 1703216 rebellion narrates events 
since 1680s and does not go back to preceding decades. However, considering the fact 
that the court was in Edirne since mid 1650s, would it be a more fruitful approach to 
extend the analysis of 1703 rebellion in way to include pre-1680s as well in order to 
have a better assessment of the rebellion’s origins?  
 
Apart from the questions concerning administrative and military structure of the 
time, the role and function of the religious institution, especially the Şeyhülislam office, 
also needs attention. In this regard, the long tenures of Şeyhülislams Minkarizade 
Yahya Efendi (1662-1674) and Çatalcalı Ali Efendi (1674-86) seem to be one of the 
key points to understand the reign of Mehmed IV. Considering the relatively short 
tenures of the predecessors and successors of these to Şeyhülislams, the question arises 
as to why and how Minkarizade Yahya Efendi and Çatalcalı Ali Efendi served such 
long periods. The question becomes more crucial when one looks at the relatively 
frequent dismissals and appointments of Anadolu and Rumeli Kazaskers during the 
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period at hand. Of equal importance is the relationship between Kadızadelis and 
religious institution, a point which has not received enough academic attention among 
Ottomanists. An anecdote from Naima Tarihi reveals the intricate attitude of religious 
institution towards Kadızadelis: “…when asked why he let the Kadızadelis have so 
much influence, Minkarizade explained that in a time such as theirs it was good to have 
people like them who put fear in people’s hearts and instilled obedience in them.”217 
Linking Minkarizade’s statements about Kadızadelis with his and his successor 
Çatalcalı Ali’s long tenures, one wonders whether it was the turbulent atmosphere 
caused by the Kadızadeli movement that provided the Şeyhülislams in question with 
the opportunity of long term services in the office.  
 
Another important that point needs to be mentioned regarding the second half of 
the seventeenth century is the relationship between center and periphery. That is to say, 
while examining the social, political, economic and religious dynamics of the certain 
groups in the Ottoman society such as, the Köprülü family, the Kadızadelis, the Ulema 
and Janissaries, nearly all of the current historical studies constitute their works by 
concentrating the power base which these groups possessed in Istanbul. Until now, 
there has been no comprehensive study that tried to inquire about what the ways 
through which these groups acquired power in the local level? To what extent, for 
example, can we widen the influence of the Kadızadelis movement out of Istanbul or to 
what extent did the Köprülü households extend through the Empire. Similarly, while 
the socio-political significance of the Ulema and the janissary throughout the Köprülüs 
period in Istanbul seems to be passive compared to preceding and subsequent years, 
what was the position of these groups in the provinces? It is true that some studies 
examines the status of these two groups in regional level, however we still need to fill 
the gap between the common characteristics of the groups who lived in Istanbul and the 
provinces and their interaction with each other through the prosopographical network 
analysis.  
 
Last but not least, without elaborating the factionalism in the Palace during the 
second half of the seventeenth century, how can we reach an alternative reading of the 
Köprülü period and the reign of Mehmed IV? Since Peirce’s comprehensive study 
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related to the Imperial Harem ends with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as 
the grand vizier in 1656 and Şenocak’s study does not pay attention to the politics in 
the Harem after this time onwards, it is not possible to answer to the question that how 
the important figures in the Harem were engaged with the politics along with the other 
circles of power in the Empire during the rule of the Köprülü Family (1656-1683)? In 
this sense, to what extent did the abatement of the Black Eunuchs’ role in the Harem 
explain the success of the Köprülü Family?
 218
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